


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Foreword

This edition of the *Collegiate Social Sciences Review* was noteworthy for a number of reasons. The research published came from a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to history to political science, reflecting the quality and depth of research from the undergraduate students at Robert Morris University. Secondly, the production of this edition took place in the midst of a statewide shutdown due to the outbreak of COVID-19; the broad participation of both students and faculty speak highly to their dedication to scholarship.

Special thanks to Philip Harold, Associate Dean of the School of Informatics, Humanities, and Social Sciences, Toni Brendlinger of the Academic Media Center for all of her work formatting and publishing the journal, and all the scholars whose hard work and research made it possible: Kara Blum, Deanna Darras, Grace Fertenbaugh, Samantha Medasie, Chris Micsky, Jordan Redinger, Gulnoza Tursunova, and Garrett Wiseley.

—Soren Fanning, CSSR Editor

1

Roe No More: What Will Happen When Roe v. Wade Falls

Samantha Medasie

Abortion has been a controversial and divisive issue in American politics. Prior to President Trump's administration, abortion was a seemingly stagnant issue in the legislature. In the years prior to 2016, Americans saw much fewer abortion restrictions being passed at the state level. Recently, though, more Americans seem to be engaged in defending or combating abortion rights, and since 2016, abortion advocates have felt that the legality of abortion is at stake. They are likely correct. President Trump has nominated two anti-abortion Supreme Court justices, and during his first term, the United States Congress and state legislatures across the country have debated and passed legislation on the issue of abortion. At a time when

abortion, once a taboo topic of discussion, is such a prevalent issue, it is more important than ever to know the associated facts. Unfortunately, abortion advocacy organizations have been pushing rhetoric that is not entirely true, misleading thousands of Americans in the process. A simple review of the research in this field reveals their fabrications and shows us what will most likely happen if abortion rights under *Roe v. Wade* were to fall.

History

The first abortion restriction was passed in Connecticut in 1821, and forty years later, twenty states had passed laws limiting abortions. In 1875, suffragettes and first-wave feminists like Susan B. Anthony spoke out against abortion. However, in the mid-to-late 1900s, the tide quickly turned. In 1965, the landmark Supreme Court case, *Griswold v. Connecticut*, ruled that privacy is a protected right. Soon after, several states started to repeal abortion restrictions. In 1973, *Roe v. Wade* struck down all state laws restricting abortion and *Doe v. Bolton* made abortion legal throughout all nine months of pregnancy by expanding the definition of women's health. *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*, a 1992 Supreme Court case imposed the undue burden standard, setting the current standard for state-level abortion restrictions. Recently, there has been speculation about a potential overturn of *Roe v. Wade*, which would allow each state to individually determine the legality of abortion.

How will *Roe v. Wade* be overturned?

In 2019, Americans were confronted with an abundance of media coverage on new state abortion laws. On May 15, 2019, Republican Governor of Alabama Kay Ivey signed the nation's most restrictive abortion law. The law bans abortion throughout

all nine months of pregnancy with very limited exceptions. Other states have passed laws restricting abortion after certain pregnancy milestones, such as when a fetal heartbeat can be detected. These bills are often referred to as “Heartbeat Bills.”

On the contrary, other states have begun to implement laws that protect abortion access in order to codify abortion access in the case that *Roe v. Wade* is overturned by the Supreme Court. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Reproductive Health Act on January 22, 2019, the forty-sixth anniversary of *Roe v. Wade*. The law allows a woman to seek an abortion throughout all nine months of her pregnancy.

A 2019 *Fortune* article cites the opinions and predictions of three distinguished law professors, Mary Ziegler, Laurence Tribe, and Robert Nagel. Florida State University Law Professor Mary Ziegler argues that if *Roe v. Wade* were to be overturned, it would be through small, incremental changes to the law made by the Supreme Court. Ziegler also suggests that it is highly likely that the Supreme Court will make so many incremental changes to *Roe v. Wade* that it will eventually be unrecognizable.

Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe predicts that the Supreme Court will likely avoid reviewing the abortion-restrictive Alabama law until after the 2020 election. If the Supreme Court does not choose to review the case, the 11th Circuit Court’s opinion would determine the fate of the law. The lower courts are likely to strike down the law due to its nonadherence to Supreme Court precedent.

University of Colorado Law Professor Robert Nagel argues that Supreme Court justices will be hesitant to revisit the precedents. Nagel states that the justices’ immense respect for the Court will stop them from departing from precedent. This unwillingness to depart from precedent can be seen in several Court opinions,

but perhaps most famously in Chief Justice John Robert's 2010 *Citizens United* concurring opinion, in which he wrote, "Fidelity to precedent—the policy of *stare decisis*—is vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function....For these reasons, we have long recognized that departures from precedent are inappropriate in the absence of a 'special justification.'" *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. 310, 5-6 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring).

Overall, most legal scholars agree that *Roe v. Wade* will not be overturned all at once. It is more probable that the Supreme Court will review restrictive state legislation and incrementally chip away at *Roe*. Either way, Americans in many states will likely begin to experience more restrictions and barriers to abortion access.

Points of Contention Between Abortion Advocates and Adversaries

Abortion advocates and adversaries disagree on the implications of abortion restrictions. The two groups have very different ideas about what will happen if *Roe v. Wade* were to fall. Although there are countless points of contention between the groups, four issues are argued the most frequently: Are abortion restrictions effective? What will happen to the foster care and adoption systems? Will abortion restrictions lead to more women dying? What about the victims of rape and incest? There are misconceptions about each of these issues, but a thorough review of existing research yields the likely answers to each of these questions.

Are abortion restrictions effective?

A common argument from abortion advocates is unrelated to the morality of abortion itself. Many claim that abortion restrictions simply do not decrease the number of abortions at

all. They commonly reference a study by Sedgh, et al. (2016) that examines abortion rates for women in different countries around the world. The study finds that abortion rates are similar in regions where abortion is legal and where it is illegal. The findings suggest that abortion restrictions do not lead to fewer abortions, and are thus ineffective and even dangerous in that they promote illegal abortions. However, a major flaw of this study is that it does not compare like to like. It compares countries in Western Europe and North America, where abortion is legal, to countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where abortion is illegal.

It makes more sense to examine the statistics of comparable geographic locations before and after either abortion restriction or legalization, which has been the basis of hundreds of studies. Several studies show that abortion restrictions lead to less abortions. Gober (1997) found that access variables, such as restrictive state laws, affect the abortion rate in those states. Similarly, Blank, George, and London (1994) finds that when public funding of abortion is eliminated, a significant decline in abortions take place. Selik, Cates, and Tyler (2011) also find that in three cities where public abortion funding had been restricted, there was a decline in the number of legal abortions and no increase in the number of illegal abortions.

Studies also show that the legalization of abortion leads to more abortions. Michael (2009) finds that women who became pregnant before *Roe v. Wade* had dramatically lower abortion rates than women whose pregnancy occurred after *Roe*. Examining the adoption rates of U.S. states yields a similar result. Bitler and Zavodny (2002) finds that state-level repeal of abortion restrictions prior to *Roe v. Wade* resulted in a significant decline in the number of adoptions.

When examining the statistics of comparable geographic locations before and after either abortion restriction or legalization, it is clear that abortion restrictions do result in fewer legal and illegal abortions. Thus, if *Roe v. Wade* were to be overturned, it is nearly certain that there would be a decrease in the number of abortions in states that enact restrictive abortion laws.

What will happen to the adoption and foster care systems?

Every American has heard a horror story about a child in the foster care or adoption systems. Abortion advocates argue that restricting abortion access would lead to more frequent occurrences of these unfortunate instances in foster care and adoption. However, studies have shown that this would likely not be the case.

Not only do abortion restrictions decrease abortion by outlawing them, but they also indirectly decrease abortion by reducing the number of unintended pregnancies. This is a result of individuals viewing abortion as an insurance policy; if someone knows they are able to obtain an abortion, they are more likely to participate in risky, unprotected sex. Donahue and Levitt (2001) state that the view of abortion as an insurance policy induces individuals to engage in more sexual conduct with less protection against pregnancy, thus substantially increasing the number of pregnancies.

Levine, Trainor, and Zimmerman (1996) analyze twelve years of state data and find that abortion funding restrictions are associated not only with a reduction in abortion, but also no change in or a reduction of births. Similarly, Felkey and Lybecker (2011) find that abortion restrictions in the form of parental consent mandates induce women to utilize contraceptives, thereby preventing unwanted pregnancies. Additionally, they find that legislation expanding abortion access has the opposite effect.

According to the Guttmacher Institute (2019), the annual number of abortions performed continues to decline each year. In 2017, approximately 862,320 abortions were performed, and if the current trend continues, we can expect there to be less in the years to come. Meanwhile, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016), approximately 12% of women aged 15 to 44 experience impaired fertility. The CDC (2008) also reports that 57% of women experiencing infertility or impaired fertility consider adoption. The Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption (2002) reports that 40% of adults in the United States, about 81.5 million Americans, have considered adoption. Two million Americans are already pre-approved to adopt.

Practical statistics aside, an adopted child or a child in foster care that has undergone terrible circumstances still has a life worth living. Eddie Murphy, Marilyn Monroe, Simone Biles, John Lennon, and Babe Ruth all grew up struggling in the foster care system; each one of them then went on to add value to the world in the form of sports, music, and entertainment. If they had been aborted, the value that they added to the world would be nonexistent.

If a restrictive abortion law were to be put in place, there would be fewer pregnancies that end in adoption than the number of pregnancies that currently end in abortion; this is because implementing restrictive abortion laws would lead to fewer unintended and unwanted pregnancies. Even if every mother experiencing an unintended and unwanted pregnancy were to put up her child for adoption, there would still be a plethora of families willing to adopt. Additionally, basic economic ideas suggest that an increased number of babies available for adoption would force the price of adoption to decrease and

would also motivate the current system to improve efficiency.

Will abortion restrictions lead to more women dying?

Abortion advocates have repeatedly claimed that thousands of women died due to illegal abortions and that thousands more will die if abortion were to become illegal again. Former president of Planned Parenthood Leana Wen tweeted, “Before *Roe v. Wade*, thousands of women died every year — and because of extreme attacks on safe, legal abortion care, this could happen again right here in America.” This claim has been repeatedly debunked since 1969 and even received a “Four Pinocchios” rating from the Washington Post.

Calderone (1960), the former medical director of Planned Parenthood, claims that abortions performed both legally and illegally are not dangerous procedures. Calderone references medical breakthroughs, such as chemotherapy and antibiotics, that have made all surgical procedures safer. She also mentions that ninety percent of illegal abortions are conducted by physicians. Guttmacher (1960), the former president of Planned Parenthood, states that physicians performing illegal abortions are usually skilled in their practice, claiming that “they have to be good to stay in business, since otherwise they would be extremely vulnerable to police action.” Nathanson (1977), co-founder of NARAL Pro-Choice America, confessed that the group knowingly inflated statistics in order to eliminate abortion restrictions. Similarly, Potts (1977), former medical director of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, wrote that groups advocating for liberalized abortion law falsely claim that a largely inflated number of women die annually from illegal abortion. Even the Center for Disease Control and Prevention refutes this erroneous claim, citing one hundred eighty-nine tragic deaths from illegal abortion in 1966, thirty-

nine in 1972, and nineteen in 1973.

Even further, Klick and Stratmann (2003) find that because individuals engage in more risky sexual behavior when abortion is legal, sexually transmitted diseases, such as gonorrhea and syphilis, are positively correlated with abortion legalization. They find that the relationship between sexually transmitted diseases and abortion is causal and that abortion legalization is responsible for one-fourth of the average disease incidence.

Planned Parenthood and abortion activists of the 1960s and 70s knew that thousands of women were not dying from illegal abortions, but inflated the statistics then in order to gain public support for legal abortion, which they deemed safer. Research has shown that abortion has harmful intended and unintended consequences for women and their partners. When legal abortion access is threatened, it is convenient to resort to these inflated and false statistics in an effort to sway public opinion.

What about the victims of rape and incest?

Abortion restriction exceptions for instances of rape and incest is perhaps the most emotionally charged point of contention between abortion advocates and adversaries and even among pro-lifers. There is no question that rape and incest are horrendous crimes and that perpetrators must be punished. Some instances of sexual assault can lead to unwanted pregnancies, and many believe that an abortion can remove the painful evidence. Unfortunately, it does not. Abortion is a second act of violence and can leave women feeling worse about themselves.

Furthermore, rape and incest are rarely the reason for a woman choosing abortion. Finer, Frohwirth, Dauphinee, Singh, and Moore (2005) find that only 1% of women who chose abortion did so because they were raped, and only 0.5% did

so because of incest. Of course, this is not meant to discount the pain that victims of rape and incest feel. However, it is important to note that widespread abortion rights should not be afforded based on a small percentage of victimized women.

What about bodily autonomy?

“My body, my choice” is the most common argument used by abortion advocates. This phrase is at the center of the bodily autonomy argument within the abortion debate. For this argument to succeed, it must be assumed that unborn babies do not have their own intrinsic value and rights. There are two specific arguments for bodily autonomy: the sovereign zone argument and the right to refuse argument.

The sovereign zone argument states that a woman has sovereignty over her womb. This argument is unique in that its proponents actually acknowledge the separate humanity of unborn babies, derived from the fact that they have their own unique set of DNA, but purport that a woman’s choice is more important. If the womb truly was a sovereign zone, no abortions would be morally wrong. Intact dilation and extraction, or partial-birth abortions, would be morally permissible under this argument. That means that it is moral for a perfectly healthy baby’s body to be delivered up to her neck, and while her head is still inside the birth canal, scissors are jammed into her skull to create an opening large enough to suction out her brain. Moreover, the sovereign zone argument implies that there is no injustice in selling fetal body parts. A woman could impregnate herself and have an abortion simply to profit off her baby’s body parts. Whatever happens inside the womb cannot be criticized; there are no moral standards.

The right to refuse argument implies that women have the right to refuse to provide so-called “life support” for the unborn

babies in their wombs, just as they can refuse to donate an organ to someone in need. However, abortion is much different than refusing to provide life support or refusing to donate an organ; it is the intentional killing of an innocent human being. Most people would agree that we have a moral obligation to help the most vulnerable people in our society, especially when we are the only person in the position to do so. Suppose you are alone in a cabin in the middle of the woods on a snowy winter night, and you find a baby crying on the porch. You are morally required to care for the baby, as it will surely die if you do not. A pregnant woman is in a unique position, as she is the only individual in the world that can care for her unborn baby at that particular moment in time. Morally, she does not have the right to refuse her baby the support that only she can provide pre-birth.

The “my body, my choice” argument that is tossed around so carelessly is shown to support gruesome, violent, and immoral acts when it is fully considered.

Conclusion

Roe v. Wade is on the brink of extinction, and abortion advocates are terrified. With a shift in the ideology of the Supreme Court, increased attention in federal and state legislatures, and the refutation of misleading information, the abortion industry feels threatened – and rightfully so. Abortion is no longer a taboo subject; it is a popular topic of conversation from televised political debates to the family dinner table. That is why it is more important than ever to stay vigilant and informed. Planned Parenthood and other abortion advocacy organizations provide misinformation to the public each and every day in order to keep public opinion on their side. A thorough review of reputable, unbiased research shows us what will *truly* happen when *Roe v. Wade* falls: women, children, and families will finally be able

to heal from the violence that has been inflicted on them for so long.

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2

Captivity Narratives And Native American Imagery

Jordan Redinger

“And there I found very many islands filled with people innumerable... and no opposition was offered to me,” penned Christopher Columbus in a letter to a friend and financier of his now famous voyages to the new world.[1] These were some of the first words ever written about the new world and the people that inhabited it. Though the origins of Native Americans are a much-debated topic to this day, theories date their inhabitation of the Americas back to about 36,000 years ago and possibly that they had simply always existed on the continent. No matter how they originated, these peoples were numerous and far ranging. They had many different languages and religious customs; their creation stories were all similar yet different. The

very environment that they inhabited forced such uniqueness, from the cold and difficult north, to the rich south, and the arid west, and everything in-between.

They were not and are not a people that could ever fit a singular definition and, yet, they have long been defined in this way. Columbus and his contemporaries dealt mainly with the natives of what is now South and Central America, but much of modern imagery about Native Americans is drawn from relations and accounts of specifically North American natives. The imagery that is often conjured up of natives today does not show this variety that the hundreds of Native American tribes deserve. There are certain tropes that are ingrained into the minds of the public. They were violent and savage, killing with an unmatched bloodlust and sparing none. These natives were primitive and backwards, perhaps leading to their uncivilized, murderous behavior. However, at the same time, they managed to be ecological; their relationship with nature was almost spiritual. Natives knew when to plant, when to hunt, and when to wait. Nothing was wasted, especially not the life of an animal. Along with their spiritual connection to the physical world, they had a wise, philosophical side; their knowledge of the universe and life itself was beyond what any white man could understand.

Spirituality and moderation directly negate the image of the primitive and brutal killers. They were both peaceful philosophers and victims as well as uncivilized antagonists. These images became so ingrained into modern society that many accept one or the other, but it has long been one side that has been sold to and believed by the public, the savage one. This blind acceptance could, in-part, be due to some of the most widely dispersed and propagandized accounts about the American Indian. Captivity narratives were some of America's

first thrillers; they were full of violence, action, and daring escapades. Due to public interest in them, publications of captivity narratives were often met with high demand throughout the general public.[2] Despite telling different stories of different tribes and different lives, captivity narratives fed into and often justified the stereotypes that white society wanted to believe, these one-sided views of the natives as being savage brutes incapable of humanity. This had a lasting impact on the image of the Native American so that, in the mind of the public today, the Indian will forever wear the feathered headdress and carry the bloody tomahawk.

As natives began settling on reservations and their rights came back into the public eye during the Vietnam War era this image has since been largely altered.[3] Despite new scholarly work, Indians are still portrayed as wearing war paint and full head-dresses at all times, making all natives appear as if they were from the plains.[4] Moreover, tribal names and language has been used for many years by the United States military, a symbol of being war-like and brave at heart despite all. Even sports teams have included this sort of ferocity in their mascots, with the so named Washington Redskins, Cleveland Indians, and the Kansas City Chiefs. This characterization fits well with many of the accounts of early frontier settlers who were often victims of raids. Other extremely violent accounts of the almost repulsive actions of natives lie with the waning of the Indians during the conquest of the west as they put up their last attempts at resistance.

Father Francesco Guiseppe Bressani was taken captive by the Iroquois while working as a missionary in Huron territory.[5] Despite the French having good trade relations with the Iroquois Confederacy, Bressani suffered mutilation and witnessed much

torture during his captivity in 1644. In two letters that he penned during this time and later published in his 1653 book, *Breve Relazione d'alcune Missioni! Nella Nuova Francia*, he claimed that he only had one finger left to write with. Bressani made excuses to the reader because he could “scarcely prevent the paper’s being stained by the blood which flows from my yet unhealed wounds.”[6] Whilst enduring the many tortures he was put through almost daily, Bressani recounted that the Iroquois, a tribe of the Confederacy that was never actually named, made him and other “Black Robes” sing during long marches without food and during extreme torment.[7]

Though many Iroquois captives were taken as part of the a Mourning War tradition in order to replace lost loved ones, Bressani was not spared beatings and torment, likely because of his religious mission.[8] “They made me walk around the fire on hot ashes, under which they had stuck sharp sticks in the ground,” Bressani related of his almost nightly torture, many times stating that the natives would tear out his fingernails with their teeth.[9] In another account of torture, he wrote that they “burned some of my fingers and the rest of my nails. They dislocated my toes and ran a firebrand through them.”[10] He recounted that these tortures continued until he had a large abscess on one thigh that had to be lanced, that worms fell from his finger stumps, and that his lack of fingers made him useless to labor.[11]

Of how the Iroquois treated other native captives, especially the Algonquians and Hurons, he wrote that it was nothing but torture and cannibalism. In writing of a Huron that he was called to baptize, Bressani wrote that “the following morning they roasted him alive...they skinned and ate the feet and hands.”[12] Cannibalism is an odd addition to this narrative

as it did not feature heavily in many other narratives. In Captain John Smith's narrative, *The General History of Virginia, New England, and the Summer Isles*, he explained his experience in captivity and what he frequently feared whenever it appeared that the Powhatans were going to kill him. He wrote in third person, discussing that when his captors attempted to feed him, he refused to eat because he believed that "they would fat him to eat him." [13] Though he never actually witnessed such behavior, Smith frequently mentioned it throughout his narrative, strongly believing it to be his fate even after he was returned to Jamestown.

There were several other mentions of cannibalistic behavior in other captivity narratives, one of which being in Herman Lehmann's narrative, *Nine Years Among the Indians*. Taken as a young boy of about ten, Lehmann was captured and assimilated into an Apache tribe before being forced out and joining the Comanche. [14] During his time with them, several Comanche warriors were taken by rival Tonkaways. When Lehmann and several other warriors went on a raid to rescue their fellows, they found a leg of one of the captured Comanche being roasted and the Tonkaways feasting on parts of the others. [15] In this instance, cannibalism was found offensive, not only because it was of their fellow Comanche but because the act of eating human flesh was simply considered a horrid crime by several of the tribes. This act of inhumanity was swiftly dealt with by a violent show of force. "We scalped them, amputated their arms, cut off their legs, cut out their tongues, and threw their mangled bodies and limbs upon their own campfire," recounted Lehmann. [16] In this instance, what was considered the ultimate form of native savagery was met with and reprimanded by more violence, perhaps lending to the image that natives were

even more contentious and reprehensible in the atrocities that they committed to each other.

More than cannibalism, Indians used fire torture on their captives. Famously, Dr. Knight recorded the death of Colonel Crawford during his brief captivity among a group of Delaware Indians. This narrative was used as an example of the excessive violence and total depravity of their society because of the brutal torture of the colonel; it is often not noted that Crawford's torment was retaliation for the Gnadenhütten Massacre of natives which Crawford himself led.[17] Knight recalled being made to sit across from five other prisoners and watch as they were scalped and tomahawked to death. After which, "an old squaw cut off his head and the Indians kicked it about on the ground." [18] This was just the beginning. Both Crawford and Knight were then led to a fire where Crawford was prepared for his trial by being painted black, a signifier that his death was to be by the fire. Knight wrote that the natives blew gunpowder onto the captain's body before cutting off his ears.[19] Next, sticks were lighted on fire and "three or four Indians by turn would take up, individually, one of these burning pieces of wood and apply it to his naked body." [20] For this part of the torture, the captain had been tied by a rope attached to a post so that, whichever direction he ran around that post, he was met by another Indian brandishing another burning stick. Knight also testified that the women of the tribe would throw hot coals at Crawford or upon the ground so that he was always walking on them.[21] This lasted for what Knight speculated to be an hour and a half to even two whole hours. Finally spent, Knight wrote that Crawford laid down on his belly and the natives scalped him. "Repeatedly, they threw the scalp in my face. 'That is your great captain,' they told me," wrote Knight.[22] For his part, Knight

managed to escape before he met the same fate in a Shawnee town.

Another captivity narrative, dictated to Hugh H. Brackenridge, a lawyer in Pittsburgh, detailed the life of a man who was twice a captive of natives.[23] John Slover lived among the Miamis for six years before being traded to the Delaware for the next six years of his captivity; he was treated very well during this first captivity. After being re-assimilated into Virginian society, he joined the Continental Army and eventually Colonel Crawford's botched expedition.[24] Upon his second capture during this expedition, Slover recalled that the Indians recognized him and were deeply angered in his turning sides. "The inhabitants came out with clubs and tomahawks and struck, beat, and abused us greatly," said Slover.[25] Made to leave before he could witness the rest of the torture of his fellow captives, Slover recounted what he saw after the day's tortures were concluded:

"That same evening, I saw the dead body of this man close by the council house. It was mangled cruelly, and the blood mingled with the powder was rendered black. That same evening, I saw him after he had been cut into pieces and his limbs and head put on poles... That evening I also saw the bodies of three others in the same black and mangled condition... The next day the bodies of these men were dragged outside the town. Their carcasses were given to the dogs and their limbs and heads stuck on poles." [26]

For Slover, a council was held to decide what fate he deserved, a man who had once been considered one of them and who now helped hunt them. They agreed to burn him as supplies were too scarce to be taking captives.[27] Slover was fully prepared for death by fire, was even tied to the post with a lit fire beneath

his feet, when “the wind blew a hurricane, and rain followed in less than three minutes.”[28] This put out the fire and made the natives believe that they were not meant to kill him that day; his death was postponed day-by-day until his escape.[29]

In many of the earlier colonial captivity narratives, violence was withheld from the captive themselves but enacted on all that the natives decided not to take. The accounts narrated by female captives frequently involve the sudden slaughter of their children. In 1792, Mercy Harbison was taken captive for several weeks from her homestead on the Ohio-Indiana boundary.[30] Though she was able to hold onto her young infant, her other children were not so lucky. When her three-year-old son was unwilling to go with the Indians, Harbison stood witness as “they took him up by his feet and dashed his brains out against the threshold of the door. They then scalped and stabbed him.”[31] Later, when her oldest son was lagging from an injury, Harbison’s captors tomahawked and scalped him, raining down blows upon his mother when she fainted at the sight.[32] It is imaginable what an account as hers would do for the public’s view and hatred of the natives who not only killed children but made their mothers watch as it was done.

Another account, given by Mary Rowlandson who was captured by the Wampanoags, under King Philip or Metacom in 1676, told of similar actions towards children.[33] She described attempting to leave her burning house while being shot at by the natives, saying that “the bullets flying thick, one went through my side, and... through the bowels and hand of my poor child in my arms.”[34] This same child continued to live for several days before dying. Of other victims after the attack, “there was one who was chopped in the head with a hatchet, and stripped naked, and yet was crawling up and down.”[35] Once again, such

accounts as mother's witnessing their children suffering and relatives being butchered, resonated with those that lived on the frontier. Harbison's narrative featured inhuman suffering for a mother but also acts of incredible motherly will in keeping her child alive while Rowlandson's featured a mother's desperation to keep her family together despite being held prisoner and separated. These two narratives were some of the most sought-after pieces of literature when they were published; they manifested the frontier settler's deep hatred of the Indians and gave justification for retaliation.[36]

Other narratives were violent for other reasons than torment and gore; later narratives written during the conquest of the West by the United States military tended towards constant warlike themes. Lehmann's account, perhaps one of the most well-known of all captivity narratives, did reference several killings of young children and the incident of cannibalism mentioned previously. However, Lehmann's narrative stands-out more in that the way of life out in the West was much more difficult and war-driven. He noted that the Apache lifestyle was often very strict and militant. Wives who were not faithful had their noses cut-off to indicate their misdeeds.[37] He related how cruel even giving birth was, witnessing a mother who had twins, and "she became so angry because there were two children instead of one that she stamped her offspring to death and left their little bodies to the vultures." [38]

During his time among both the Apache and Comanche, Lehmann noted many incidents of small battles and skirmishes. They would fight almost anyone they came across and stole from many others. Throughout his narrative, Lehmann noted having fought against Comanche, Apache, Kiowas, Mexicans, Rangers, buffalo hunters, Tonkaways, and various other small tribes in

the area. Even more, he recounted being bet on in fights against other captive boys, earning respect in this brutal way.[39] It was not until he had killed and scalped a Mexican, however, that Lehmann was considered a warrior among the Apache.[40] In almost a decade of living with Indian tribes, his captivity and assimilation often featured death and murder prominently, all of which was done and recounted in a very matter of fact way.[41]

Narratives like Rowlandson, Harbison, and Bressani's all lent to the movement of Indian hating during the Colonial period. There could be no mercy for such primitive people as would mutilate a priest and kill children. When Indians imagery was revisited during the Vietnam War era, with the use of tribal names as names for new machinery, this war-like rhetoric shifted to fit the military and with it so did imagery in advertising and entertainment. Natives were then pictured as brave warriors, a force in battle that all good American soldiers should be. It was then a narrative about a group of peoples that refused to submit to what was considered inevitable, progress. Their way of life, what could perhaps be considered a war against the world, was often construed as a sort of noble violence. Despite their killing many settlers and Rangers, these were a people that upheld achievement in battle as the highest bravery.

It is not shocking that tribal names are often used by the United States military. What began as an excuse to commit crimes and seek vengeance against Indians, the savage stereotype about natives became altered later. It became about being strong, brave and willing to fight to the bitter end. This image appears to be molded to fit the uses of the government at any point in time; Indians were no longer considered a threat by the Vietnam War era. The natives were uncivilized and cruel when

they needed to be pushed off their lands, but honorable for the resistance once they had been defeated.

There is another and overlooked perspective to this story, however. It has not been one so much told until after the Indian Civil Rights movement coincided with the counter-revolution that inspired academics to re-examine the popular literature and imagery about Native Americans.[42] Multiple civil rights movements during this time allowed minority groups like Indians to be more vocal about their mistreatment and simply their stories in general. This led to the molding of a new Indian, a new native for a new narrative. With this new interest in revising the image of what an Indian really was like, the savage mythology about the natives had to be debunked. Rather than only seeing the natives as one-dimensional, uncivilized and blood-lusting savages, they were now portrayed for their humanity. The literature about them, the first-hand accounts of native behavior were now looked at with the understanding of the biases of the writer and, perhaps, the hidden agendas as well.

It is easy only to see the bad in captivity narratives, to only see the violence and traumatizing remembrances of those that survived. However, it must be remembered that many of these narratives were not written by the captive themselves. Slover's narrative was dictated because he could not read nor write.[43] Mary Harbinson's narrative was actually her statement at a deposition in Pittsburgh just a day or so after her escape and return to her husband and likely while she was still in a great deal of shock from the experience.[44] Lehmann's narrative was also dictated to editor J. Marvin Hunter. In the introduction to the memoir, Hunter made the statement that Lehmann "can look back into the far and dim past without regrets over any overt

act he may have, in the savage state, committed, because, as he says, he was taught by the Indians to steal and kill.”[45] This sentiment made it clear that Hunter wanted the public to know that white folk could not commit such behaviors, that Lehmann would never have acted that way had he not been taught by the natives. Dr. Knight’s and Slover’s narratives occurred during times of war between natives and colonists in which both sides were engaging in total warfare that resulted in brutalities on both sides.

It is noticeable in these narratives, and in many others, that there was a distinctive bias. Whether it be that the narratives were not actually written by the captives themselves and were so used as tools to influence the public or that their unique experiences occurred at such a time so as the violence was common, many of the captivity narratives that depicted the savage nature of Indians were not without flaws, inaccuracies, and extremes. These narratives made it appear as if the natives were driven by certain desires for violence, blood, and torture. However, it did not consider how the Indians themselves came to behave that way. In Lehmann’s narrative, he often mentioned fighting the Texas Rangers and refusing to go onto reservations. This was part of the native resistance to the West being taken over and the Indians being forcefully removed through violence and starvation. Lehmann made several references to buffalo hunters killing the buffalo off as well as to military men scalping the Indians. In this case, the Comanches and Apaches were acting possibly more violent than usual due to the new circumstances of their lives.

In other narratives, Indians were brutal towards their captives because of past experiences with white settlers and traders who cheated or stole from them. John Rodgers Jewitt came

to America from England to be a blacksmith in Boston. After crossing the Atlantic, the captain of the ship Jewitt was on decided to put-in at Vancouver Island, British Columbia in 1803.[46] The local tribe of natives, the Nootkans, were friendly towards the crew at first but rather suddenly ambushed and violently killed the whole crew, sparing only Jewitt and the sail-maker whom Jewitt pretended was his father. During his captivity, Jewitt kept a journal which he later published as “The Headhunters of Nootka.” This account included many violent incidents. Unlike many other tribes described in other narratives, the Nootkans did not collect scalps but beheaded people and kept the heads on poles; this was seen in the attack of the crew. Jewitt’s captor, Maquina, also related a cautionary incident to him about some previous captives who had attempted to escape but were captured. Maquina recalled that “four men held each prisoner on the ground and forced open his mouth, while they choked him by ramming stones down his throat.”[47]

At first, this narrative appears to be much like the others with Jewitt noting only the poor treatment of himself and the violent natures of the people that held him. However, after Jewitt had learned the language, he discovered that the Nootkans had been abused in past encounters with whites. Maquina’s home was raided for skins and robbed in his first encounter with a fisherman at the same time four Nootkan chiefs were killed not far from the village by a Spanish captain.[48] In another incident, over twenty of Maquina’s tribe had been killed by a visiting ship’s crew over a missing chisel.[49] Having only had bad experiences, Maquina and his people would only be expected to have an ingrained mistrust of white visitors and expect only betrayal and pain from them. Upon his liberation,

Jewitt described Maquina as having such a great affection for him and the friendship they had cultivated that he wept and would only leave with promises that Jewitt would return to visit him. Jewitt later did return to visit and even set up an amicable trade relationship with the captain that rescued him and the Nootkans.[50]

Several captivity narratives followed this pattern. Upon first captivity, the natives appeared violent and likely to kill all who they had taken in horrible ways. However, as time in captivity progressed, further understandings between the two were established. The captive may not have accepted everything about native society, but they appeared to enjoy or at least find a way to tolerate much of their new lifestyle. These captivity narratives read rather like assimilation or adoption stories in which the Indians themselves simply took in the captive as a new brother or sister among them. For the captive's part, it seemed that a deeper appreciation or respect was gained for the natives who were seen more as people and often described as having noble, beautiful, or even heroic features in the eyes of whom they captured.

One of the most notable narratives that followed this line was Colonel James Smith's experience among the Delaware Indians. Captured in 1755, Smith was held for four years before leaving them to return home to Franklin County, Pennsylvania.[51] Despite being fully dressed as a Delaware immediately after his capture, Smith wrote that, "I at that time knew nothing of their mode of adoption, and had seen them put to death all they had taken, and as I never could find that they saved a man alive at Braddock's defeat, I made no doubt but they were about putting me to death in some cruel manner." [52] His captors were in fact performing his adoption ceremony. After stripping

Smith bare, they washed him in the river, later telling him:

“My son, you are now flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone. By the ceremony which was performed this day every drop of white blood was washed out of your veins... you are adopted into a great family, and now received with great seriousness and solemnity in the room and place of a great man... you are now one of us by an old strong law and custom. My son, you have now nothing to fear - we are now under the same obligations to love, support, and defend you that we are to love and defend one another; therefore, you are to consider yourself as one of our people.”[53]

After this rebirth into native society, Smith was never restrained nor abused. He was adopted by an elderly native man and his young son, both of whom Smith grew to have a great affection for. At one opportunity of escaping the tribe, Smith refrained from leaving simply because he could not bear the idea that he would have left Tecaughretanego and his son to starve in their isolated winter hut.[54] This regard for his captors' lives seemed to be born out of a deep respect for the elder native, Tecaughretanego, and what Smith referred to as his speeches about tranquility and contentment during suffering.

After a particularly long period of suffering from starvation during a winter on the banks of Lake Erie, Smith eventually managed to find and kill a bear. Once refreshed, Tecaughretanego gave a speech to his son and Smith. In this speech, the older native addressed Smith saying, “Brother - As you have lived with the white people, you have not had the same advantage of knowing that the great Being above feeds his people, and gives them their meat in due season, as we Indians have... Be assured that you will be supplied with food, and that just in the right

time.”[55] Smith himself made the point of noting that he, at first, found Techaughretanego and his people’s religious beliefs and values to be “altogether incredible” or slightly fantastical. However, he went on to say that, after becoming acquainted with them, the Indians were “not an ignorant or stupid sort of people, or they would not have been such fatal enemies.” He also referred to Technaughretanego as “the Indians Socrates.”[56]

This was clearly an instance in which, even though the captive still sought his freedom, he was content and respected the natives whom he had lived with. Smith did not describe his liberation nor return to colonial society as anything of the sort. He simply referred to it as leaving the natives, but Smith also returned to visit the Delaware tribe that he had been adopted by in 1760, noticing that they showed great joy at seeing him alive as they had mourned what they assumed was his death upon his disappearance. In addition, the natives noted with pride that Smith still retained the gait and gesture of a native.[57]

Jewitt and Smith were not the only captives who developed a fair amount of respect for their captors. For Lehmann, he seemed to view his captor, Carnoviste, as a fatherly figure who made him into a man and a warrior through hard lessons. He often recounted Carnoviste making him eat raw meat, serve him in almost all ways, and learn to fight just like all the other young Apache warriors. Lehmann progressed through resentment to being completely loyal to Carnoviste despite initial coldness for his captor’s part. In an inter-tribal dispute that quickly became violent as a result of alcohol, Lehmann found himself in risk of losing his life. He recalled that “a warrior raised his spear to end my days, but Carnoviste, seeing the movement, thrust him through with a lance. At the same instant a medicine man killed Carnoviste.” [58]

According to Apache tradition, medicine men were considered sacred, and killing one meant certain death. Despite knowing this, Lehmann recalled that “my heart was filled with a hatred that was unleashed by the killing of my chief.”[59] Even though he knew he would be exiled or killed after, Lehmann was in such anguish over the loss of his chief and captor that he killed the medicine man in vengeance. Throughout the rest of the narrative, despite almost starving to death in exile and being in danger of assassination every time he encountered an Apache, Lehmann never once regretted avenging Carnoviste’s death. Even when trying to join the Comanche, he did not hide why he had to flee the Apache’s, immediately telling them that he had violated a sacred belief held strongly by many Native Americans. The Comanche, for their part appeared to respect him for his loyalty towards his chief, and Lehmann was accepted among them as a warrior.[60]

In his time among the Comanches, Lehmann also held a certain respect for the leader, Quannah Parker, who often allowed Lehmann to live among his family and gently encouraged him to return to the reservation and eventually his family. In saying goodbye, Lehmann wrote that Parker said, “he would be a brother to me, and insisted that if I did not have any people that I should come back and live with him.”[61] It was out of respect for Parker’s leadership and wisdom that Lehmann returned home and found a way to re-assimilate back into American society. Much like Smith and Jewitt, Lehmann eventually returned to the Indians who took him in. However, for Lehmann, he came to stay after being granted a headright in Indian territory among his Comanche brothers.[62] It is interesting that, for as much was written about Lehmann’s reformation to ‘proper society,’ he still chose to the native

lifestyle in the end.

As much as many captives remembered feeling respect for their male companions and captors, there were just as many accounts that specify the gentleness and kindness of females, even great regard for their opinions. John Tanner, the “White Indian,” was taken by Ottawas when he was about ten years old as a part of their mourning war tradition; Tanner was to replace a young man.[63] He remembered how his new father, Manti-o-geezhik, took him to meet his new family, writing how the older wife embraced him. He wrote that “she began crying. Then, hugging and kissing me, she led me to the house.”[64] This was of course expected according to the mourning war tradition that the captive would really replace the person lost. However, the old wife took this tradition to heart even though her husband remained hostile towards Tanner. She and almost all the other natives of the tribe took him in and treated him well, often helping him escape Manito-o-geezhik’s frequently abusive rage.

During his thirty-year stay with various native tribes, Tanner grew affectionate with a young woman in one of the various tribes that he lived with. The older woman whom he later lived with, Netnokwa, was influential in how their relationship progressed. She allowed Tanner to carry on the affair until he stayed a whole night in the company of Red-Sky-of-the-Morning. Tanner recalled that she woke him the next morning by rapping him on the feet with a stick and saying, “Up, young man- you who are about to take yourself a wife- up and start after game. It will raise you more in the estimation of your future wife.”[65] Though he resisted for a while- finding that the more Red-Sky-of-the-Morning openly showed her loyalty and affection for him, the more her beauty seemed to fade-

Tanner eventually gave in to the chidings of Netnokwa rather than the pursuit of his mistress. Rather than committing to marriage out of affection, he committed to it because of the respect he held for the matron and motherly figure that he lived with.[66]

This regard for Netnokwa was born out of her saving his life. During an outbreak of disease, Tanner had abscesses form and discharge in his ears, causing him unspeakable pain and leaving him confused for a very long period of time.[67] Netnokwa, noticing that he had been considering suicide, ensured that his gun was unloaded and his powder horn and ball pouch were emptied; she quietly made it so that he would not be able to kill himself and without Tanner being embarrassed in front of the whole tribe when he did make an attempt.[68] It was this occurrence than made Tanner so appreciative of the older woman who cared for him, and it displayed her influence over the whole tribe as, under her instruction, the incident was never mentioned by any of his friends.

Other accounts mention women, young and old caring for captives. Nelson Lee's captivity narrative, "Three Years Among the Comanches," mentioned such an instance in which one of the wives of his captor took kindly to him and cared for him more than others. Much like Netnokwa for Tanner, Lee seemed to care for the younger wife of one of his captors who he was traded to. Kianceta, or "the Weasal," appeared to be both sympathetic to his situation as well as motherly towards him. In writing of her, Lee described Kianceta as "indeed comely to look upon, but her soul was far more lovely than her form." [69] In fact, in many captivity narratives, the women were often depicted as having good or noble souls. Similarly, in Jewitt's time among the Nootka, he mentioned an occurrence in which

he was obligated to take a wife. Commonly, like the other male captive narratives such as Tanner's, Jewitt chose his wife based on her looks. He described her features as being equal to or even perhaps superior to any European beauty standards; the next descriptor was that she "appeared eager to please me." [70] This, at that time, was considerably favorable, especially to be spoken of about a native woman. Jewitt's regard for his wife grew when, during his illness, he felt he would recover better without their marriage. Even as he sent her away, believing that she was the cause of his ill-health, Jewitt believed that she was too good and kind-hearted for him. She went peacefully out of affection for him and hopeful of his recovery. [71]

Regard for both native and white women, in captivity narratives, was very high. Despite overall physical abuse when captives were taken, Harbison, Rowlandson, and many other female captives never reported sexual assault or even general disrespect for women. In Harbison's own narrative, her defiant spirit was praised by her captors and helped garner more respectful treatment. While fleeing with Harbison, one of the natives gave her a heavy load of goods to carry which was too much for her. Out of frustration and anger, she threw these things on the ground several times, despite the native who angrily kept replacing them upon her. Eventually, he gave up and another native approached her saying, "Well done; you did right and are a good squaw, and the other is a lazy son-of-a-gun; he may carry it himself." [72]

At other times, the natives seemed to show considerable regard for captive women. Famously, the captivity narrative of Fanny Kelly, a young woman who was taken captive at nineteen years of age during a wagon trail raid by Sioux warriors, was sold to the public precisely because of the kind treatment of

Kelly among the natives.[73] From the beginning of the raid to how she was returned to Fort Sully, Kelly's account detailed her life among the Sioux as having a sort of romantic trend; many believed that her great beauty and charm made the Indians fall in love with her. She herself, in the writing of her story, did not negate this theory and led the reader to believe that her beauty brought a Crow native to betray his own people to ensure that she got returned to the fort safely.[74]

Perhaps, a more accurate revelation that can be drawn from her narrative was the shock she received at the poor treatment of Sioux women by white military men from Fort Laramie. She recalled many women bringing their children to see her upon her first arrival and that there were many children of mixed ethnicity. Upon conversing with one mother, she learned that the woman "had been the wife of a captain there. When his white wife arrived from the East, his Indian wife was told to return to her people." [75] After hearing many other "sad stories" of this ilk, and learning that these half-blood children were abused by their fully native peers for their birth, Kelly recalled being overwhelmed at the cruelty of how these women had been neglected by their white husbands. It was hard for her to comprehend that her own people could possibly be so cruel to marry an Indian woman while married to another and, conversely, the bigotry behind it appalled and saddened her. As with many captivity narratives, Kelly discovered that the monsters she feared, the natives themselves, were not as scary as the reality of how cruel white folk could be as well.

It is not easy to make a blanket statement that can accurately describe all captivity narratives. They are each different, and the actions depicted in them are told from the unique perspective of a human being describing the behaviors of other human beings.

This can lead to a great deal of fallibility, exaggeration, and bias. Words like uncivilized, savage, and wild are all commonly used as descriptors. However, these same narratives may use words such as wise, brave, heroic, and noble to speak of the natives. Even in the most violent and cruel narratives, there is always some sort of light or goodness to be found in the people who are so frequently condemned, the natives. Despite being at war with the whites, as in Knight and Slover's trials, or being taken advantage of and neglected, as in Kelly and Jewitt's accounts, the natives still found a way to show basic humanity such as cleaning wounds or giving the captive more food. Even in Lehmann's account, taken during some of the most brutal fighting during the Apache war for freedom, revealed just as much good in the natives that he interacted with as the bad.

This is precisely what makes these accounts so valuable in the study of history, especially Native American interactions with settlers. As inaccurate as these accounts can be, they offer the unique perspective of a white person surrounded and taken in by a people they do not understand and fear because of that lack of knowledge. During their time as a captive, no matter how long or short, they were forced to adapt and to attempt to understand a people's they had refused to previously. In the narratives where the captive was open to assimilation, or who at least accepted it for survival, their time among the natives was marked by fair treatment, affection, and fond memories. Unfortunately, many such narratives have been buried throughout history or only used for their violent aspects rather than the portrait of humanity that they paint.

There is not a definitively good nor bad captivity narrative. In American and any other society, there is no purely good group of people. It is interesting then, that natives were often

described and portrayed in imagery as singularly savage and completely violent. Natives were held, it seemed by a different standard; they could only have a one-dimensional personality. This stigma was spread to the common public, and that is what many of the captives, in their narratives, must unlearn. It was almost described in a shocking way when they noticed kindness and bravery among the natives. Many of the captives, knowingly or not, displayed the possibility of what communication and understanding could have done in the time-old settlers versus Indians narrative. Moreover, had their narratives been written accurately and without bias and, similarly, read with the same unbiased eye that did not only look for bad, these valuable historical accounts could perhaps have shifted the perception and imagery of the Native American to more accurately depict his humanity.

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Międzymorze & The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Christopher Micsky

Background

There was a concept present in Poland for a period of time known as *Międzymorze*. This can be loosely translated into a phrase meaning “between seas.” This idea was used as an effort to defend against outside invaders, mostly from central Asia and Muscovy^[1]. This idea blossomed from a theory into practice, with the ever so important, but rarely mentioned, piece of European history in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. With the combination of the two royal families between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, this Commonwealth took off very quickly, as there were brand new ideas of political maneuvers being first implemented here. As the Commonwealth continued, the definition of *Międzymorze* took new forms. This evolved from a mere union of the Polish state

and the Lithuanian state, but to an extension of all Ruthenian people. This proposed union was actually very popular amongst some of the lower classes, but the nobles could never quite seal the deal, and the Ruthenians eventually went back into the fold of their more traditional informal allies with the Russians. However, this is an important concept that even has modern applications, so the sentiment is still there. Stepping away from this rather long tangent to talk about this, what if the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth actually had secured the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian extension like they had proposed? This is a popular what-if question asked by historians that study the era, but this thesis will take aim at this idea and show that it was because of the foreign powers surrounding the Commonwealth really inhibited any great strides to be taken in this regard, and led to the subsequent partitions of the Commonwealth's territory.

In the history of Europe, many nations have risen and fallen. Some have had a meteoric rise and fall from power; while others have had such durability that they have existed as a single state for many centuries. Poland is a nation that has had a very well known, tumultuous, modern history. However, there is a forgotten time period for the Polish as they were on top of the world. In the early modern period, the emergence of Prussia from Brandenburg, Sweden becoming a major power, Russia accumulating power under the powerful Romanovs, and many other stories dominate the history of the timeline; however, one of the most highly effective states at its inception was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was a highly sophisticated state in politics, economics, and even militaristic influences. Poland and Lithuania had created a government system that united a large group of people under a strong set of

political ideals. While the Commonwealth lasted from the 14th century to the 18th century, the collapse of this state is really the part that makes it the most interesting. How does a state so large and so vastly powerful just seem to fall apart at the seams and have their lands partitioned to the other large powers of the area? The answer lies in many parts, but the focus of this research lies within the source of foreign intervention.

Looking at the basic geography of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (which hereafter will be referred to as “the Commonwealth”), one can see the particularly rough situation that they were in. To the North, the Swedish state was accumulating a lot of power in the Baltic peninsula, and were not particularly keen on the Commonwealth maintaining ports rivaling their own. To the East, the great military power of Prussia loomed. Prussia was an odd case because they were a former Commonwealth fief itself, which will be mentioned in further detail later, and that the organization of the government and nobility forced their hand and accelerated their expansion into the Commonwealth. To the South, the ever present power brokers of Europe, Hapsburg controlled Austria, lurked in the shadows waiting for their time to strike as the Polish-Lithuanian State began to collapse. Then came probably the largest enforcer of the region, the Russian Empire. Russia had always exuded some control over the Commonwealth, as they were rivals in almost every aspect of culture. Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Democracy against Monarchy, and many other issues really made the two sides butt heads. That being said, as the Commonwealth’s power waned, the Russians exploited this weakness and almost vassalized the state. Under Catherine the Great in particular, the Commonwealth saw extreme advances into territory, politics, culture, and many other

aspects of Polish-Lithuanian life. Before getting into further detail on how foreign intervention derailed the Commonwealth, we need to explore some of the background of the state, and how some of the machinations of the government and socio-political hierarchy helped aid in the advance of the Commonwealth's seemingly abrupt demise.

At the Union of Warsaw, the two states of Poland and Lithuania combined into a single, political union that was seemingly unprecedented at the time of its inception. This nation quickly rose as a pillar of power and culture in a region that was seemingly bare in both categories. The intention was to unite against a common Russian enemy that was keen on invasion of both states. With the new idea of a democratic state that would elect the monarchs, the innovation was a sight to behold. However, even with these new ideals, there were holes in the plans for it to work at full efficiency. The *szlachta*, the Polish word for the nobility, were a different force than the other nobles of Europe. Where most European nobles banded together in the interests of their state's ruling dynasty, the *szlachta* instead would band together to promote the interests of themselves. For example, there was a way that the nobles would describe who they were that displayed how they would distance themselves from the unified state. So, where today someone may say that they are a person from a certain area (i.e., an American, a Canadian, etc.), members of the *szlachta* would denote their regional identity preceding their Polish identity using a phrase such as "*gente Ruthenes, Natione Polonus;*" using Latin, the common language of the Commonwealth, to say that they are Ruthenian in blood, but Polish by nation^[2]. This is an important distinction because rather than accepting the Polish-Lithuanian identity outright, they instead would make sure

that their ethnicity was known. Now, a lot of people are very proud of the heritage, sometimes adding tags to their nationality with said heritage, but the fact is that the szlachta never truly accepted their identity as a member of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Instead, they assumed an identity into a more social identity called the *naród szlachecki*, Polish for the “noble nation.^[3]” Some scholarship does look at this in a different manner. Some historians see it as if they had a form of pride in their national identity, thus adding the *Natione Polonus* tag to the phrase. However, when looking at the time period in which this was taking place, taking such pride in your nation and ethnicity was unheard of. The wave of ethnic nationalism in Europe was not present until the 19th century, so for the nobles to proudly declare their national and ethnic identity in the Commonwealth meant that the idea of the *naród szlachecki* must have been quite important. This identity came to dictate domestic, and foreign, policy for the entirety of the Commonwealth. It would not be a far stretch to say that the power of the nobility was a great hindrance to the operations of the Commonwealth.

Even outside of these cultural ramifications for the Commonwealth, the nobility had been granted privileges that had the intention of keeping a multicultural, multinational state such as the Commonwealth in a balance that had never quite been seen before. The szlachta effectively had checks to make sure that the monarch could not become too powerful. Especially the members of the szlachta in the *Sejm*, the Polish-Lithuanian Parliament, wielded unprecedented amounts of power for a member of European society that was not at the level of the monarch; as well as the members of the *Senat*, the Polish-Lithuanian Senate. The power of *liberum veto* was something that really trademarked the machinations of politics in the Com-

monwealth. Looking at this from an optimistic and pragmatic point of view, liberum veto provided an outlet for members of the Sejm to openly end discussion or a vote on any topic. This made it so that the Sejm can, quite easily, end any form of autocratic threat from the king so that power could not be abused to inflict any harm on the population of the Commonwealth^[4]. Now, looking at liberum veto from a more cynical view, with the helpful aid of hindsight, one can see that liberum veto opened an excessive course of actions in which the power of few influenced the power of many. Eventually, liberum veto was killed off by the May 3rd Constitution, but it was far too late to reverse its far-reaching implications^[5]. One thing that can't be argued, is that the course set by liberum veto was expounded upon by the foreign powers that surrounded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and led to the partitions and subsequent demise of the largest state to exist in East-Central Europe.

More political details that came to the forefront of the issues come from the "Golden Liberty" ideals of the Szlachta. In the late 16th century, members of the Szlachta banded together to propose their own set of reforms against the monarchy and its influence on the nation. Most of these reforms look fantastic and extremely enlightened for the time; such as the holding of elections for the monarchy (where the Szlachta would be able to elect their kings rather than relying on a dynastic roll of the dice), a Sejm being required to be held every two years in order to stay on top of large-scale issues, acceptance of the Warsaw Confederation which guaranteed religious freedoms, creation of the *konfederacja* (right to organize into groups with common political aim, and maybe most importantly the creation of liberum veto as an accepted political practice^[6]). These Golden Liberty acts can be seen as extremely progressive for the time

and genuinely good ideas for a nation; however, it soon came to be realized that the nature of most of these would be abused and put a metaphorical foot in the door for political corruption at the hands of foreign intervention to run rampant across the Commonwealth^[7]. To the point of the elective monarchy idea, the end of the famed Jagiellon dynasty in 1572 left a void in leadership, and the practice of an elective monarchy, that was inherent in the Polish-Lithuanian Union prior to the creation of the Commonwealth, was adopted as the way forward. However, the szlachta saw this as a way to further cement their role as the dominant political force of the Commonwealth. They began the practice of only electing foreign-born rulers for the Commonwealth; this way, there was little chance for a family to begin a long-standing dynasty in the Commonwealth and possibly take power away from the szlachta. This was absolutely an avenue for foreign powers to begin their slow corruption of the Commonwealth's political base.

The way that foreign policy was handled was another way that aided in the partitions of the Commonwealth. The King, as we have seen many times throughout this essay, had limited power compared to the other monarchs of the European continent. When the Union of Warsaw combined the powers of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the checks placed on the monarch were very restrictive in the foreign policy aspect. Utilizing the practice of *pacta conventa*, no ambassadors were to be elected without approval from the Sejm, and for important negotiations there was to be approval from both houses of the legislature. In the negotiations, the legislature would appoint commissioners to handle the process rather than giving the power to the monarch^[8]. While some exceptions were made, particularly in the reigns of Jan Kazmierz, for the most part

the relations of foreign powers was out of the hands of royal privilege. Many nobles instead took to their own method of foreign intervention; raising their own armies and wielding their own power to hold negotiations. To complicate matters further, both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had their own foreign interests and mostly handled their business independently in this regard. So, for example, if Lithuanian nobility was looking to escalate with Russia but the Polish nobility and monarchy did not want to intervene, the matter usually went on one-sided, greatly affecting the outcome of most diplomatic decisions that most always put the Commonwealth at a disadvantage in negotiations. Again, this was another situation in which the nobility really affected the way that the Commonwealth dealt with what was happening with their nation.

The way that the monarchy was elected allowed for openings for outside powers to intervene and attempt to sway the votes in favor of a candidate who was willing to give in to some demands of the other nations. For example, in the late 18th century, the May 3rd Constitution of 1791 was ratified. This constitution was one of the most progressive legal documents that had been seen, but with the progressive aspects that were intended to end the corruption of the szlachta that had plagued the nation for years. It was extremely forward in rooting out the corrupt machines in the inner workings of the government, getting rid of such practices like liberum veto and helped foster growth of the Polish nation by extending nobility status to lower burghers (making social mobility easier), as well as change from an elective monarchy to a hereditary monarchy. This last change became important for the matter of foreign intervention. While the monarchy was legitimate, the elective process made it

almost into an auction style; where nations could place demands on the table and whichever candidate would fold and accept each of them would be greatly assisted in becoming the next monarch of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. With the ratification of this constitution in 1791, the surrounding nations all swarmed into Poland.

Another detail that will affect the eventual outcome of the Commonwealth is the cultural geography associated with it. When looking into the breakup of the population, one can see why issues would arise; and how that breakup would affect what the goals of the nobility were. So, the total population of the Commonwealth totalled at roughly 7 million people. Out of that 7 million, roughly 4 to 5 million were Polish natives. Only about 1 million ended up actually being the other half of the namesake of the Commonwealth in Lithuanians, and the rest of the remaining 1 to 2 million people remaining were of Hungarian, Ruthenian, Belarussian, other Baltic peoples, and many other demographics made up the remainder of the population^[9]. This population breakup may not seem like much, but for the time period it actually was incredibly diverse. This made for decisions being made very tough, as each population had their own agenda for what they would like the Commonwealth to do. The power struggle between the greater Poland area and the area of traditional Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands was something that could never really be handled properly. Now, with that population breakup, there is an important distinction that can be made that affected the foreign outreach that will be detailed later in this essay.

In the region of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, specifically in the areas of modern day Belarus and Ukraine, the cultural background was very Russo-centric. For example, the Kingdom

of Poland was an area dominated by members of the Catholic faith, while the Grand Duchy came in as a state dominated by the Orthodox faith. Now, not to be facetious, there were efforts in order to change the faith over as a conversion to Catholicism; however, the effort was well-intended, but the population seemed to resist the change. This can be described as having a more Russo-centric point of view when it came to culture. Another way to provide evidence for this is through an analysis of language. When analyzing the main language spoken in each part of the Commonwealth, the early court documents of the Lithuanian court dictated that they were more inclined to speak the traditional Russian, with estimates of Russian speaking people clocking in at roughly 75% of the former Grand Duchy³. Now, this alone is not an indicator that the Russians had a firm grasp on the Lithuanian state, but the fact of the matter is that Ukrainians and Belarussians took less of a liking to the Polish influence when the merger of the two nations came about. This is not to say that this majority of the Lithuanian state did not fully merge with the Polish state, but the stark contrast of cultures made it harder for the two states to fully merge and that the Lithunians may have had little to no sense of identity with the Polish state. While they were in a “Commonwealth” with each other, there was no real cementing of the two areas as a comprehensive nation. Competition between the nobles of both areas became an area of contention; all wanting to take the Commonwealth in their own direction.

Russia

Chiefly, of the nations that were tied to the collapse of the Commonwealth, Russia had always been a thorn in the side of the Polish and Lithuanian people. One of the major reasons that the two monarchies united was because the Russian Empire

had been attacking the lands of Lithuania and nearly crippling them into submission to the Russian state. The Kingdom of Poland saw this as an opportunity to get back at their long-standing enemy, and offered a union between their state and the Lithuanian state. Creating this buffer between the Polish state and the Russian Empire greatly angered the Russians, and they were keen on having the wrongs righted. So, the Romanovs looked for chinks in the armor that was the newly established political system of the Commonwealth. One way that they found a way to breach into the Commonwealth's government was through the Sejm and Senat. The nature of the demographics present in the Sejm and Senat opened the door for foreign intervention. The Szlachta held the majority of the positions in the Sejm, and the higher ranking members of the Szlachta were typically represented in the Senat. Having these nobles on the inside of the government is useful for any nation, but the Russians had an advantage that came to them in the 16th century.

After a military defeat at the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks, a treaty was signed that offered protection to the Ukrainian people at the hands of the Russian Empire; the Treaty of Haidach. This was a treaty that the Commonwealth proposed as an effort to add a Ruthenian element to the Commonwealth's title. Effectively, this would elevate Ruthenian people to the same status as Poles or Lithuanians in society. This effort may seem curious, however, this was an effort to officially sweep the rug out from underneath the Russians and have a buffer zone of friendly territory between the original state and the Russian state. That being said, the effort was passed by the king and Sejm, only after an altering of terms by the Szlachta in which the Ukrainians would have to cede all land to the Szlachta. Where this was

originally a popular treaty amongst the Ukrainians and other Ruthenian people, the alterations were seen as an alienation of them; thus they instead pledged an informal allegiance to the Russians instead of the Commonwealth. This failed treaty very well may have sealed the fate of the Commonwealth on the eastern front of their territory¹. This influence of the Russians on the Ukrainians was enough to snowball into an almost crippling effect.

Russia in particular, took offense to the implementation of the May 3rd Constitution, as they saw the Commonwealth as attempting to usurp power within the Eastern European sphere of influence. The Russian Empire had long been a beacon of strength in the area, while using a system with an emperor and empress under the Romanov Royal family. Now, the Polish state was not proposing democracy with its May 3rd Constitution, but its increased rights given to more people of the Commonwealth was a dangerous proposition to have so close to the Russian state. Also in the Constitution, the abolition of the practice of liberum veto was a great hindrance to Russian intervention in Commonwealth politics. They saw the constitution as an extension of the Jacobin movement seen in French Revolution^[10]The Russians, however, still had one more trick up their sleeve. The May 3rd Constitution greatly limited power in the szlachta, so not everyone in this class was too keen on losing a firm grasp on the machinations of the Commonwealth. So, the Russians, with the backing of Catherine II, helped form a group which would come to be known as the Targowica Confederation. This group was formed in the interest of reversing the implementation of the May 3rd Constitution. The formation of this confederation gave Russia a backing for invasion, so only two days after the formation of the Targowica

Confederation, the Russian, Prussian, and Confederate forces all invaded the Commonwealth^[11]. Being vastly outnumbered, the Polish forces soon capitulated and surrendered to the enemies; thus leading to the second partition of the Commonwealth. There would be one more partition of Poland, but the second partition was the most damning of the trio; taking away major cities such as Gdansk (which Prussia would name Danzig), and parts of Rawa, Masovia, and several other areas to Prussia; and areas such as Kiev, Minsk, Vilnius, etc. to the Russian Empire. Empress Catherine II even said when discussing the second partition, “Now I’m taking Ukraine in recompense for my expenses and loss of people^[12]” This partition shrunk the population of the Commonwealth by more than half and was an effective death sentence for the Commonwealth even though it would exist for another 2 years^[13]. This event and the betrayal by the Targowica Confederation were so formative on the Polish state, that the word *targowica* is a word that has become synonymous with the word “treason” or “treachery^[14].”

Prussia

The next area of contention that aided in the eventual partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is the state of Prussia. Prussia was unique in that it was, at one point, a part of Poland. In 1657, the states of the Holy Roman Electorate of Brandenburg and the Duchy of Prussia. Before that, there were parts of the future Kingdom of Prussia, who we will be coming to deal with soon, that were serving as a fief in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, as Polish power waned, the Kingdom of Prussia united^[15]. Now, the way that Prussia seemed to take advantage of the unstable Commonwealth was from a very discreet manner. The rise of Prussia did take a long time to come about, but their time under

the Commonwealth. Where the Russians used abject terror, the Prussians used cunning political maneuvers to work their way into the lands and governance of the Commonwealth. In one instance, to wreck the economy of the Commonwealth, the Prussians minted fake Polish coinage that were proved to be worthless only after it was too late^[16]. Also with Prussia, when Russia invaded in accordance with the May 3rd Constitution and the formation of the Targowica Confederation, Prussia waited until victory was almost certain; then invaded and thus took the cities of Gdansk, Toruń, and almost the entirety of the territory of Wielkopolska^[17]. Some analysis of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Commonwealth seem to dictate that the two areas grew out of almost entirely different motives. When looking at how states grow, there are several models that can be used. If a state is suffering from severe pressure from their neighbors, typically the state will rally around the centralized government. So, when Poland was fighting their wars with Sweden and Russia in the 1600s, the expectation would be that the state would rally around the monarch. However, they did not, mostly due to the szlachta's pushback against a strong, central government, as the szlachta had been known to do time and time again. Now, the Prussians saw this crumbling, and rather than getting in on the action right then and there, they waited and stayed their hand on acting on the Commonwealth. Instead, they consolidated their power and waited until the opportune moment to strike with the fullest extent^[18]. Another unique thing about the Prussian state as it quickly assumed power and jumped above the Commonwealth in efficiency and power very quickly in its inception. Really, state cooperation of the nobility was a major piece that the Polish szlachta was missing that almost shot the Commonwealth in the foot; as opposed to the Prussian nobility

who were really treasured by the central government¹⁴. This work with a tandem central government and noble class made the Prussian state rise very quickly, helping them leapfrog the Commonwealth very quickly.

Sweden

Another nation in which the Commonwealth saw much push-back was not even from the mainland continent, but from Scandinavia in the North, Sweden. While the Swedes did not actually gain any territory from Poland in the partitions, it did not really matter. Sweden had always wanted one thing from the Commonwealth, for them to be out of the Baltic peninsula. The Polish port city of Gdansk was extremely powerful, and was drawing away from the Swedish ports, especially Stockholm. Sweden longed for Danzig as an administrative center in the southern Baltic, so their goals revolved around that when it came to the Commonwealth. So, their one goal, once they amassed the power to do so, was to remove Poland from the area. In the Swedish Empire, there was a concept related to the power in the Baltic and their longing for complete control of it, using the Latin phrase, *Dominium Maris Balticae*^[19]. This phrase had the same mentality and resonance within the empire as the idea of *Mare Nostrum* had on the Romans. The Swedes had long been amassing power in the Baltic peninsula, with the rise of Gustavus Adolphus really kicked off the campaigns in his reign in the early 1600s, but it was really in later periods of the 17th century in which Sweden made up most of its ground against the Commonwealth.

While Sweden's military power increased more and more, the more they were keen on an invasion of the Commonwealth. Subsequently, after several years of waiting and waiting, the Swedish army attacked the Commonwealth in a chain of attacks

that came to be known as The Deluge. In this series of attacks, the Swedes, with the backing of many foreign powers such as Russia and Prussia, the Swedes invaded the lands of Poland with overwhelming numbers of troops. As most wars go, the subsequent sacking of major cities was extremely prevalent^[20]. When sacking the city of Warsaw, they took much of the treasure and precious items native to the Commonwealth, having still yet to return them to their rightful home^[21]. The odd thing about the Deluge is that the Commonwealth technically won. They drove the Swedes, Russians, and Prussians out of their territory with several impressive military victories, but the losses associated with the Deluge made this victory entirely pyrrhic. While the Commonwealth pushed back and really ended the idea of Swedish expansion into Gdansk or any other Baltic region of the Commonwealth, the places that the Swedes and the Russians in particular sacked were extremely lucrative centers of the Commonwealth. With major advances and sacks of major cities in the areas of Greater Prussia, Wielkopolska, Małopolska, Pomeralia, and many other regions, the major power centers of the Commonwealth had been left in shambles^[22]. The Deluge also left some of the hallmark institutions of the Commonwealth as a complete shadow of their once great implementation. For example, the Deluge was so wholly terrifying for the people of the Commonwealth, that they began to turn on the value of free religious practice in the Commonwealth. Now, it was not an inquisition of non-Catholic religions, but rather a pseudo-alienation, in the regard that Protestant and Orthodox Christianity were now synonymous with mistrust^[23]. Also, the Deluge's destruction of the lands of the Commonwealth was the death sentence that could begin the partitions of Poland. Although they did not come for a multitude of years, the szlachta could

not cooperate with each other and the national government in an effort to save the Commonwealth from destruction from the outside^[24]. So, where Sweden was not a direct part in the partitions of the Commonwealth, its actions in the Baltic region especially during the Deluge, made the Commonwealth weak and susceptible to foreign intervention.

Austria

The last state that affected the Commonwealth was the Austrian Empire under the Hapsburg royal family. Now, I do not want to delve too deeply into the Hapsburgs because that is not the intention of this thesis; however, the nature of Hapsburg interactions with foreign powers in Europe and the holes in the governmental structure of the Commonwealth was a textbook way in which the Hapsburgs would dominate Europe. As mentioned in the background section of the Commonwealth, the lack of a singular royal family in Poland after 1572 meant that foreign powers could vie for their members to become monarchs. The Hapsburgs were notorious for this throughout Europe, so they thought much of the same could come from political interference in Poland. However, as they tried and tried to intervene in Poland, the results that they were used to did not pan out for them. With both nations being Catholic, the Hapsburgs could not use Papal leverage into the state, with the Carpathian mountain range separating Vienna and Kraków so that invasion was easily defensible by the Commonwealth's forces, and also sharing common enemies in Sweden, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire meant that there was no real strategic value in going after the Commonwealth^[25]. However, this did not fully stop the Hapsburgs. Even after several political defeats, they waited and waited for their turn at the Polish system. Eventually this turn came when the Russians and the Prussians

went in for the third and final partition of Poland after the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794. The Romanovs and the Hapsburgs decided on an alliance with each other in order to help facilitate the destruction of the Commonwealth for good. So, after a good start by the rebels, the three powers shut down the rebellion for good and they all managed to get large swaths of land. Prussia got the Greater Prussian area with Gdansk, Toruń, and other cities in the northwest of the Commonwealth, Russia got the entirety of the Lithuanian shell, and Austria received really the rest of it all, with major cities such as Lwow, the area surrounding Kraków, and territory up the city of Warsaw falling into their hands^[26]. The Austrians under the Hapsburgs had done what they did best, take advantage of the weaker governance of Poland with many political holes and missteps in foreign policy, and gained a large amount of lucrative territory from it.

These stories of the foreign powers partitioning the lands of the Commonwealth are only part of the reason for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and placing all of the blame on one piece of the problem is not the intention of this research. That being said, the missteps and miscalculations of the Commonwealth's governance are extremely important in describing the end of this massive state as we know it. The szlachta, for the most part, never truly remained loyal to the Polish-Lithuanian state, thus allowing for the outside nations of Europe to get their foot in the door to flood the Commonwealth's lands and create their own sphere of influence in these lands. With Russia, a very stark example is looking at the Targowica Confederation and how their betrayal helped spell the end for the state; but looking a bit deeper at some of the background information, the presence of Ruthenian sentiment for the Russian state due

to ancestral Muscovite ties cannot be ignored. One can ask the question if the Polish-Lithuanian state was ever truly united, and that has been explored by many scholars. There is evidence to suggest that, when the union of the two states happened, it was only born out of a fear of Ivan the Terrible's raids into the Lithuanian lands during the *Oprichnina*^[27]. Harkening back to the idea of *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*, the members of the Lithuanian state always defined themselves as Ruthenians. So, it can be assumed that the Lithuanians had a general disdain towards Muscovy and the subsequent Russian Empire, but the Ruthenian ties always kept them close to each other. This made for Russian intervention that much easier for the Empire to accomplish.

With the Swedes, the desire for more power in Baltic drove them to invade Commonwealth lands. The Deluge served as an almost beginning of the end for the Commonwealth, as their most lucrative lands were robbed from and left in ashes. The Prussians were a rising power in Europe at roughly the same time as the Commonwealth. Territorial jealousies and a general yearning to be known helped the Prussians launch several offensives into Polish lands; and the partitions helped elevate Prussia to a major European power. With Austria, the Hapsburgs simply wanted to do what they had done elsewhere in Europe, politically dominate the Commonwealth to a point of almost vassalage under the Hapsburg name. While many factors prevented them from outright overtaking the political scene of the Commonwealth, an alliance with Romanov Russia helped secure a large area of Polish lands for the Austrians to call their own. These foreign interventions would not have been possible without the holes of the Commonwealth's government and the *szlachta*'s divided allegiance, but they were the metaphorical

nail in the coffin for the Polish-Lithuanian state.

Before concluding with this research, I would like to revert back to discuss the idea of *Międzymorze*. If this proposed treaty went through and united the Ukrainian, Belarussians, and other Ruthenians as equals in Polish-Lithuanian society, would the Commonwealth have been saved from their vulture-like neighbors? By bringing this population into the fold would the Ruthenians turn their allegiance to the Poles instead of their traditional allies in Russia? Would this have cemented such a block in the East that the western powers of Prussia and Austria not even dare attack? Would the Swedes to the North also take similar precaution in their fight for the Baltic, with the Deluge having little to no effect on Polish-Lithuanian lands? There is not enough research to dictate this, but it is an interesting concept to discuss when talking about how the powerful neighbors of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came to partition and divide their lands. There is enough research, however, to prove that foreign intervention by neighboring powers truly destroyed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

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4

Analysis Of The Press In The Vietnam War

Kara Blum

The decade of the sixties has piqued the interest of American historians, journalists and military historians due to the sheer number of significant events that took place. The sixties were the decade of numerous social movements from Civil Rights and Second-wave Feminism to the emergence of the New Left on college campuses throughout the nation. Often fighting for dominance in the eyes of the public was the Vietnam War. Vietnam was just one event in a series of American involvement designed to defend capitalism and democracy amid the Cold War tensions and the growing power of the Soviet Union. However,

as America rapidly changed, as did the media. For the first time in American history, the public was receiving daily accounts of the war from the comfort of their living rooms through television. The rapidly changing media forced the press in Vietnam to keep up with the high demands of their editors and producers, always calling for more stories to tell the public about American involvement. At the same time, however, the federal government continued to grow weary of the involvement of the press and the amount of information they were receiving. Presidents at this time saw the press as a tool to gain the trust of the American public while the press saw itself as the only voice of reason overseas, despite many reporters being inexperienced or unprepared to cover the stories they were given. Conflict arose under the Johnson Administration, as the press grew increasingly frustrated with the policies passed by the administration that seemed to hinder the press more than help, making it even harder to keep up with the various stories that needed covered each day. When large scale events took place such as the Tet Offensive and the My Lai Massacre, the press was nearly entirely unequipped to handle the reporting, resulting in a lack of accurate and clear reports or no reports altogether. The way stories broke to the American public began to feed into a distrust of the American government at the time, with many Americans instead beginning to trust the faces they saw reading them the evening news or the names they read in the newspaper outlining the most recent atrocity in Vietnam. For this reason, many believe the Vietnam War was lost solely due to the press- with President Lyndon B. Johnson being one of them. However, the war was more likely lost by administrations failing to support the press while doing their jobs, as well as a distrustful administration prone to hiding negative information

for fear of making the Vietnam War a front-page issue.

Background

Although the Vietnam War was not the first war in American history to be covered by the media, it was the first to be covered heavily by television. When examining the press at this time, it is important to take note of the drastic changes happening in the media during the 20th century and especially during the Cold War Era. Following the broadcasting of television news in 1940, the Commission on Freedom of the Press was assembled in order to assess the role of media, and television media in particular, in society at the time. The official report was published in 1947 following a four-year deliberation by the Commission's twelve members. The table of contents within the report outlined the five basic responsibilities of the media. These five responsibilities were to provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events, a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism, to project a representative picture of the constituent groups in the society, to present and clarify the goals and values of society, and, lastly, to provide full access to the day's intelligence.^[1] Despite the conclusion of the Commission, it still had no power to guarantee these requirements be met by American media. In order to regulate this, the federal government required stations to be licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which required stations to adhere to their four fundamental requirements outlined in the Fairness Doctrine. The Fairness Doctrine's four fundamental requirements ensured that the news was being quickly, fairly and clearly administered to the American public.^[2]

These institutional changes were not the only factors that shaped what news media would become. The Cold War Era also

brought changes to the federal government as a result of the growing “national security mentality.”^[3] The atomic age and Cold War drastically increased the power of the federal government. The threat of attacks from outside and even within the confines of the President’s circle pushed both Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to put a clamp on the amount of information leaving the White House. Through Executive Orders, Truman and Eisenhower gave hundreds of executive employees authority to classify information and created thirty new levels of classification, respectively.^[4] These changes in policy gained the attention of the press, who saw it as a wall between the Administration and themselves, which would ultimately lead to the public only gaining the information deemed good for the former.

The Press in Vietnam

From the beginning of his presidency, Kennedy cultivated a special relationship with the press. During his run for president, he perfected the skill of keeping the press close enough to appear open but far enough away to keep out the information he did not want to release to the American public. In the early 60s, press began to flood into Vietnam in order to begin near constant reporting back to their editors. By early 1962, various news organizations had established full time offices in Saigon, the administrative capital of South Vietnam. Among these news organizations were the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *Associated Press*. It was clear even in the early years of reporting in Vietnam that Kennedy wanted to make sure actions in Vietnam should be seen as military assistance rather than an American war. In late 1961, Kennedy issued orders to all U.S officials in Vietnam to “provide the press with no information regarding military or political

activity.”^[5] In these orders he also asked that reporters be referred to South Vietnamese officials. These officials, however, were often hostile towards reporters under the direction of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. In 1962, Kennedy further separated the press from the military by banning reporters from helicopter combat missions. The official information policy for governmental and military personnel was laid out in Cable 1006. This contained directions for government and military personnel to follow that can be narrowed into five general statements: 1) Do not, within interviews or any actions, imply that there is an all-out involvement in the war by the United States; 2) Stories covering civilian casualties will hurt national interests; 3) Articles criticizing Ngo Dinh Diem make American tasks harder to complete; 4) No information is to be released containing the number of Americans involved; 5) There are to be no correspondents on missions that could lead to “undesirable dispatches,” and therefore, become highly profitable for the media.^[6] Following these orders, Kennedy’s involvement in what and how the media was reporting escalated. He frequently asked editors to reassign or dismiss problematic reporters, usually using inexperience as a reasoning for their inability to adequately report on the happenings in Vietnam. One example of this tension between editors and reporters is the relationship between the *Time* editing manager, Otto Fuerbringer, and two of his reporters, Charles Mohr and Merton Perry. According to the men, Fuerbringer often rewrote articles to make them more positive as their reporting grew increasingly critical. Following a major assessment of the state of the South Vietnamese government where Mohr and Perry stated “the war in Vietnam is being lost,” Fuerbringer publicly denounced the men. This event led to Mohr and Perry’s eventual resignation.^[7]

Ngo Dinh Diem's relationship with the press is significantly more hostile than Kennedy's. As mentioned above, when Kennedy asked for reporters to refer to South Vietnamese officials, they often offered no further information. Officials often refused to speak to reports and even banned them from areas of operation frequently. In its most extreme, Diem's secret police were sent after problematic reporters. The secret police were often unleashed by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. One of the most significant events took place on July 7th, when police attacked reporters at an anti-Diem protest. Nhu was also known for producing assassination lists which were eventually discovered, often by reporters whose names were on the very lists.^[8]

As Diem's popularity took a nosedive among the press, he did no better in the eyes of South Vietnam's large Buddhist population. As a devout Catholic placed at the head of government in a Buddhist majority country, Diem was incredibly unpopular. His unpopularity grew more visible in 1963 when Buddhists were denied the right to fly their flags in celebration of Buddha's birthday. The protests that followed would be known to history as the Buddhist Crisis and were famous for the photographs of a Buddhist monk burning himself alive in Saigon. Shortly after, Diem and his brother retaliated by beating and arresting monks. Once this news reached the United States, Kennedy pushed for a change in administration. Kennedy replaced the former Ambassador Frederick Nolting with Henry Cabot Lodge. Almost immediately, Lodge began to cultivate a new relationship with the reporters in Saigon. He began meeting with reporters and answering their questions, even at times agreeing with their analysis of Diem. Privately, he expressed to American generals that a new government would be accepted, effectively green-

lighting a coup. This became realized on November 1, 1963, when Diem's government was overthrown, he and his brother being killed in the process.^[9]

Johnson and the Press

Just three weeks after the coup, President Kennedy was assassinated, placing his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson in charge. Under President Johnson's orders, the American government and military began following a new policy known as Operation Maximum Candor. Under this policy, the staff of information operations greatly increased, along with the amount of interviews and information being given out to the press correspondents in Vietnam. At this time, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was also created. Under JUSPAO, reporters enjoyed relatively light restrictions on what they could report. Said restrictions prohibited the press from releasing future plans, exact amounts of military guns or fuel, intelligence unit activities and air operations against North Vietnam in their articles. Reporters were also not permitted to discuss unit movements or names of operations unless previously released by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. JUSPAO was responsible for giving the accreditation required to report in Vietnam. Despite there being up to six hundred accredited individuals at its height, this number included everyone involved in reporting, making the true number of people responsible for collecting news around thirty to forty people. A significant number of reporters had a bias toward American involvement which often angered the South Vietnamese. The small number of reporters collecting information made keeping up with the numerous engagements daily extremely difficult. Throughout the war, several engagements took place daily across the entirety of South Vietnam's territory. With many of these engagements

only lasting minutes or hours, reporters often had to rely on military personnel for information regarding the events of the day. To add to this challenge, the American public continued to focus on the American involvement in the war. This pushed editors and producers to prefer content centered around the day-to-day actions of Americans rather than operations led by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Criticisms of Operation Maximum Candor are often regarding the governmental involvement in the press's actions, making the press reliant on the government and military for information. This, Clarence Wyatt argues, allowed the government to control the news.^[10]

President Lyndon B Johnson may have had the most infamous relationship with the press in Vietnam. Upon Johnson's arrival to the White House, he made it known he wanted to handle Vietnam in the quietest way possible, opting to follow the advice of acting Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Johnson routinely decided to not present an official position of the White House on Vietnam, thinking it would force the Vietnam issue to the front page of the papers. He feared Vietnam becoming a national issue and attracting the attention of Communist China. In May of 1964, the Pentagon presented Johnson with an option to end the conflict in Vietnam. It involved a thirty-day campaign of escalated attacks leading to a full scale bombing of North Vietnam.^[11] This plan was never carried out, however, due to Johnson's reluctance to ask Congress for a joint resolution in support of America's plan. His reluctance to involve Congress was put to an end in early August of 1964. On August 2nd, the destroyer *USS Maddox* engaged three North Vietnamese torpedo ships, resulting in four North Vietnamese casualties. Two days later, both the *Maddox* and *Turner* reported attacks, inciting an American airstrike. Years after what came to be known as the

Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Robert McNamara revealed that there, in fact, was no attack on August 4th.^[12] From the Gulf of Tonkin Incident came the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed the President to take any measures he deemed necessary to protect American interests and promote peace in the region. Johnson's desire to have the support of Congress stemmed from the mistakes made by Truman, as Johnson blamed the problems of Korea on Truman's failure to gain Congressional support.^[13] Johnson reported before addressing Congress that he did not "want to go in unless Congress goes in with me."^[14] The President's desire to respond to the attacks as quickly as possible was a reaction to the position of the Republican Party at the time. Still influenced by Cold War tension, the Republican leadership at the time continued to criticize the Democratic Party for being soft on communism and afraid to protect American interests.

Just shy of a year after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it was clear that the press was beginning to annoy President Johnson. As before, journalists were pushed toward American combat situations in order to report the news the American public was more interested in hearing. Journalists tended to focus on hard facts, making them heavily reliant on the figures of an operation. The number of casualties often showed journalists who won a battle or if the operation was successful. However, as the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Arthur Sylvester, stated, there were various goals to operations from releasing South Vietnamese peasants from a Communist camp, to disrupting enemy communications.^[15] Johnson's main concern was the possibility of the media affecting public opinion. He feared a negative press would turn the American people against the war and his presidency in general. In August, 1965,

MACV changed its policy regarding the information released to the press. In early August, they stated they would no longer give figures of the amount of aircraft attacks on North Vietnam or the bomb tonnages. In late August, they stated they would no longer release specific casualty numbers. This change in policy forced the press to speculate the actual outcomes of operations and battles, as the casualties at this point were only rated by severity rather than number. Following these changes to policy, General William Westmoreland stated that the policy of maximum candor had “had its day.”^[16] It became clear to journalists at this time as well that the days of operating under the Maximum Candor policy were coming to an end. Johnson clearly did not want the press to negatively portray American involvement in Vietnam. The press was extremely discouraged. *Newsweek* published an assessment of their performance, “Coverage in Vietnam... suffers from undue reliance on centralized sources.”^[17] Most notably, William Tuohy stated in an article for the *Los Angeles Times*, “We’re drowning in facts here, but starved for information.”^[18] The frustration of the press began to grow by this point, forcing many members of the press to carefully choose how they worded every article. In many cases, reporters were concerned any article that criticized American involvement would appear disloyal to the United States. The pressure to remain loyal to the United States was extremely prevalent within television networks, as they faced the risk of losing their FCC licensing.

Television Media

Television has been referred to as the “first domino” of American public opinion due to its incredible effect on the people. By 1965, Television news broadcasting shaped itself into its modern form, with CBS and NBC delivering nightly

news broadcasts to the American public. Television's advantage stems from the medium itself. Newspapers rely on still images and can be dry or seem unattached. In contrast, the television allows for moving images to tell a story, making it a more dramatic show that is able to capture an audience. A poll was taken by the Roper Organization for the Television Information Office in 1964 asking Americans where they received most of their news. At this time, newspapers and television were almost equal with 56% and 58% respectively. However, when the same poll was taken just eight years later in 1972, television took a significant lead over newspapers with 64% of Americans getting most of their news from the television and only 50% preferring newspapers.^[19] Other news mediums included in the polls were radios and magazines, taking smaller percentages. It is important to note that the polls permitted multiple answers to each question. Television broadcasters also appeared more trustworthy to the general American public. This was due to the personal nature of the delivery, allowing the viewer to see the face of the deliverer, as well as the use of images which allowed the viewer to see the events as they transpired. The television caused more problems for the American leadership later in the war, especially as stories of American brutality began to come to the surface.

The Tet Offensive

The Tet Offensive is often marked as the major turning point in the Vietnam War, especially in regards to journalism and how the media reported on Vietnam. The Tet Offensive was planned by North Vietnam as a large-scale attack designed to put an end to the war by inciting a political uprising within South Vietnam, turning all Vietnamese support away from America. Tet was planned to begin during a previously agreed upon ceasefire

to celebrate the Vietnamese celebration of the Tet Holiday, or Vietnamese New Year, from which the strategy gains its name. The evening of the Tet Holiday, a widespread series of attacks on South Vietnamese villages and United States military bases began, catching the US and ARVN forces off guard. During the series of attacks, the North Vietnamese systematically killed South Vietnamese sympathizers, Catholics, and government agents. Despite early hopes of success, the North Vietnamese were not able to successfully complete their objectives. However, The Tet Offensive is often most known for its effect on Johnson and America rather than its success or failure within the eyes of the North Vietnamese.

The challenges that faced reporters since the early 1960s still plagued reporters into 1968, therefore hindering the reporting of the Tet Offensive. At this point, there were still very few actual reporters in Saigon, leaving too many stories and not enough coverage. However, producers and editors of American publications were still pushing for stories focused on American troops. Despite being well into the war, journalists were still not briefed on the Vietnamese language or history.^[20] On top of this, the press corp in Vietnam tended to be inexperienced, as reporters often stayed in Saigon for only twelve to eighteen months at a time.^[21] This made it impossible for journalists to gather enough information to form an opinion on the course of the war. When the Tet Offensive began, most reporters could not understand the effects or the meaning behind the widespread attacks. This was not true for a few reporters such as Charles Mohr of the *New York Times* and Merton D. Perry of *Newsweek*, who had been in Saigon since 1963.

The Tet Offensive broke just after midnight in Saigon, meaning that with the time difference, editors in New York received

the news just after lunchtime. Due to the wire-service communications, editors were able to hear the events in almost real time. However, this type of reporting made it easier for erroneous information to be sent directly to New York to be published as fact. One instance of this was the report of a wall of the US Embassy being blown up and the building being infiltrated by North Vietnamese. The story was reported by Peter Arnett and AP news. AP kept its initial reports that a wall had been blown in and that North Vietnamese were walking around inside the embassy despite news from General William Westmoreland himself that they had been encountered within an outer wall and were stopped before entering the building.^[22]

It is due to the Tet Offensive that there became a split in opinion on the effect of the press on the war's outcome. Some defend the press, saying they were only responsible for exposing the flaws in American strategy while others claim this is the moment the press began to lose the war for America. Tet started the year 1968- a year already set to shake up Washington and the press, as it was a presidential election year. Tensions were already stirring in Washington as people began announcing their bid for Democratic and Republican nominee. Johnson began hearing dissatisfaction from Democratic frontrunners and there was a growing Conservative movement especially in the historically democratic southern states. In March of 1968, President Johnson announced his decision not to run for re-election, making way for the anti-war democratic frontrunners- Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. Before the Tet Offensive, it appeared that the war of attrition was taking a toll on North Vietnam, making it appear to the American public that the end was in sight.

My Lai

The My Lai Massacre has become known as one of the most significant events to take place during the Vietnam War. On March 16, 1968, an entire village, My Lai, was wiped out by American troops led by Lieutenant William Calley. The village was home to several hundred Vientmaese citizens including women and children, leading the event to be referred to as the My Lai Massacre. No reporters were present at the time of the event and those who did witness it did not relay the information to the media following. This resulted in the events at My Lai being kept from both the media and, as a result, the American public, for over a year. The first official publication of the events did not reach the American public until November of 1969.

The story was pieced together by Ron Ridenhour. Ridenhour was not at My Lai during the events, but pieced together the story from other troops over time. Upon finding out that hundreds of innocent civilians were killed, he began writing to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, several Congressmen, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even the President himself, which eventually led to an army investigation. During this time, most of the media stayed quiet with the exception of Seymour Hersh. On a panel covering the topic of My Lai and its relation to modern day journalism of which Hersh attended, he discussed his experience as the story was beginning to be released to the media and American public. Hersh was well known within the press community being that he was Eugene McCarthy's speechwriter and press secretary during the 1968 Presidential election. Despite his credentials in the field, Hersh found it difficult to get the story into the mass media, saying, "I knew every reporter, and I was taken seriously. I still could not get a newspaper to run the story."^[23] Ridenhour, who was also on

the panel, discussed his view of My Lai and its contradiction to public opinion after the story broke. The public opinion at the time was that Lieutenant Calley simply went crazy and he and his men attacked a village. In reality, Ridenhour states, My Lai was an operation designed by the United States government. To support this statement, Ridenhour points to two key pieces of information. Firstly, there was a second massacre on the same day at the village of My Khe, only three miles away.^[24] Second, there were various officers and lieutenants confirmed to be in the air over the villages all morning who would have been able to clearly see that the people being killed were not grown adult Viet Cong forces, but children. It was for these reasons that Ridenhour assessed that My Lai was “an act of counterterrorism.”^[25]

Over a year after the events at My Lai, the story broke to the American public. Despite the massacre occurring in 1968 under the leadership of President Johnson, when the story broke to the public, the newly appointed President Nixon took the blow. Both NBC and CBS began running stories of American soldiers in violent situations such as stabbing pro-North Vietnamese captives or standing by as South Vietnamese interrogators beat prisoners. At this moment, the image of the “good” American soldier, determined to help protect South Vietnam from the true “bad guys” began to fall apart. By late November, CBS released an interview with Paul Meadlo, a member of Calley’s platoon. Meadlo’s interview offered horrific specifics of the massacre as he recounted the events that transpired and also admitted to killing ten to fifteen villagers himself. Photographs taken by Ronald Haeberle also began to be published, showing dead men women and children throughout the village. Haeberle kept the photographs on his personal camera until the story was

released by Hersh. President Thieu of South Vietnam continued to support American involvement in the war, saying that due to the village's history of being sympathetic to the Viet Cong, it was understandable that some could have been killed during an American operation.^[26]

Media Influence on Public Opinion

The most heavily debated topic of the Vietnam War was whether or not the media affected public opinion and if said public opinion was what lost the war for America. President Johnson himself believed that the war had been lost because it was televised. In a speech given April 1, 1968, the day after he announced he would not run for reelection in November 1968, Johnson posed the thought, "Historians must only guess at the effect that television would have had during earlier conflicts on the future of this Nation."^[27] It was clear through this that Johnson believed that had the previous American wars been televised, they too would have lost the support of the American public, forcing the nation to leave the fight entirely. There is no doubt that historically, public opinion has affected wars, with the Vietnam War being no exception.

The Tet Offensive was, in some ways, a special case in the topic of public opinion. The somewhat distorted view of Tet from the on-site reporters at the outbreak of the attacks leads to the idea that the press heavily affected the public's opinion into thinking Tet was a significant military failure for American and ARVN forces. Tet may have appeared to be a win for North Vietnam mainly due to the image the American government had worked hard to create in the months before Tet. During the fall of 1967, the Johnson Administration promoted the idea that the war was coming to an end. Many thought at this point that North Vietnam was beginning to see the effects of the war of attrition

and would thus be stepping down. Tet may not have been successful militarily for North Vietnam, but it was successful in sending a message to the American public- there was still a significant amount of fighting to come. By January 1968, America was reaching four years of prolonged involvement in Vietnam, making it similar to the US involvement in WWII and longer than the involvement in Korea the decade prior. The American public was desperate for answers, and most importantly, the return of their men. A Gallup Poll released after Tet revealed that 69 percent of Americans favored American withdrawal after South Vietnamese troops were trained well enough to take over.^[28] Democratic Party leaders used the popular public opinion to gain support over Johnson as they prepared to face him in the Democratic Primaries before he took his name out of the running. The most significant blow to the administration following Tet came from the popular news anchor Walter Cronkite in February, 1968. In what is referred to as the "Report from Vietnam," Cronkite revealed his own personal opinion on the Vietnam situation following the Tet Offensive. Cronkite remarked, "It is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out, then, will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could."^[29]

The media's effect on public opinion likely would not be as big of a story had the press not been questioned on its bias against the administration and the war itself. In the decades following the Vietnam War, several studies have addressed the possible bias of the media during the war. A popular study was conducted by Ernest W. Lefever. For his study, he focused on the reports of CBS from 1972-73. He first split the reports into three distinct perspectives.

Viewpoint A: “external threats to U.S security are more serious than perceived by the Administration /or/ the United States ought to increase its national defense efforts.”

Viewpoint B: “The Administration’s perception of external threats is essentially correct /or/ U.S military and foreign policy efforts are adequate.”

Viewpoint C: “External threats to the U.S security are less serious than perceived by the Administration /or/ the United States ought to decrease its national security efforts.”^[30]

Lefever found through analyzing several CBS reports, that from 1972-73, CBS’s reports more often criticized the US armed forces in particular, creating a negative view of the military in South Vietnam. In regards to the Fairness Doctrine, Lefever found that failed to adhere to its requirements by not presenting the full or fair picture of an event.^[31] However, one fault of Lefever was that he equated his findings from CBS to all news broadcasters at the time.

President Lyndon B Johnson made no effort to hide his beliefs that the Vietnam War had been lost by the American press corps. Many still today believe that erroneous reporting and personal biases turned the public support away from the United State’s government. However, had the separation between the media and the presidential administration not been forged in the decades prior, the media would have shifted the way it did. The support of the press was lost long before President Johnson took office and, rather, continued to fester under Johnson’s leadership as nothing was done to mend the wounds of the decades prior.

With the Cold War came a government-wide distrust in anyone who criticized American policies. Truman and Eisenhower laid the foundation for presidential administrations to begin

concealing information from the press and, as a result, the American public. Concealing information from the press and public does not always mean there is suspect action being taken, however, with America's long history of desiring an open and honest government, the American people are not likely to take too well to information being held from them. Kennedy was next to foster a difficult-to-sustain relationship with the press. He consistently used the press as a tool to get into the homes of the American people, the televised presidential debates are frequently credited with helping him win the election of 1960. Following his election, Kennedy was not afraid to manipulate the press and carefully control the amount of information leaving the White House. In Vietnam, Kennedy routinely built up walls around the press, attempting to keep them in the areas where they were sure to write articles supporting America's involvement. It is possible that Kennedy was also aware of the power of the press but had no idea what an unleashed press would do to a full blown American war, thus deciding to limit the story to nothing more than advice and support.

If Kennedy laid the foundation for the policy towards the press in Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson continued to build it up. Operation Maximum Candor was effective only at appearing to be effective. Despite officially lifting restrictions from reporters and allowing the press to cover more of the action, it did nothing to help the staff problem in Saigon. JUSPAO was successful in giving credentials to over three hundred people involved in the press, which may look successful if it were not for the fact that only thirty to forty of those credited were actual reporters. The lack of adequate numbers of reporters at this time may have not been the direct result of Johnson's policies and perhaps more due to the abundance of newsworthy

events happening on American soil, pulling the attention away. However, as the war progressed, the number of reporters still remained inadequate to cover the amount of news being made each day. By 1968, the Vietnam War had pushed itself to one of the top issues in America, leading in the number of articles written in the years prior.^[32] Yet, when the Tet Offensive broke in January of 1968, there were nowhere near enough reporters to cover the widespread attacks.

President Johnson and many others have put the blame for America's loss in Vietnam on the press. They point to their faulty coverage, inexperienced reporters, and intentional negative reporting designed to shift public support away from the administration. However, when taking into account the relationships between the administrations and the press in the previous decade, it is evident that the press had been hindered from the start. Kennedy laid the framework in Vietnam for the press to be ignored, and Lyndon B. Johnson continued to fail to aid the press as they attempted to fairly report on the incidents. Despite initiating his Operation Maximum Candor, Johnson and his administration failed to remain open with the press, causing a growing amount of frustration within the press. Events such as the Tet Offensive and the (lack of) reporting on the My Lai Massacre show how unequipped the press was to handle the amount of reporting needed for Vietnam. This was largely due to the policies set in place by the United States government.

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5

The Decline Of Feudal Power After The Black Death

Deanna Darras

The Black Death ravaged Europe between 1347 and 1351 in a massive pandemic that took a greater proportional toll on the Eurasian population than any other war or known epidemic up to that period in time. The result of this first major outbreak, as well as reoccurring waves of infection along trade routes between 1361 and 1400, shows the disease spread from Sicilian ports, to mainland Italy and North Africa, and further on to western and extreme northern Europe.[1] Over the course of these continuous outbreaks and correlating, cyclical famines and warfare, roughly 50 million casualties can be attributed to the Black Death in Europe: or sixty percent of the European population in the mid-fourteenth century.[2]

This decimation of the European population enacted a massive toll upon all hierarchical levels of the feudal system; the immediate consequences of the disease itself were outlived by

geographical and psychological effects on both peasantry and nobility, social upheavals and revolts, and economic collapses. The decline in the feudal power of the landed nobility in Western Europe is a result of the physical and psychological nature of the Black Death, the changes in the social structure and the resulting effect on the stratified nature of feudal society, and the economic shifts that lead to the destruction of the power and influence of established noble families.

The social geography of Western Europe by the fourteenth century proves vital in explaining the high mortality rate of the Black Death and the resulting psychological impacts and resettlement of the population. Available records estimate the primary regions of Western Europe—including France, England, Spain, Italy, the Low Countries, and sections of extreme western Germanic regions—distributed the population within roughly 160,000 parishes.[3]

Despite the widespread nature of these populations they shared an almost universal trait: the people were constrained, in possession of “an invisible barrier constructed out of the ration between the land available for cultivation and the hunger of human beings” that creates an obstacle to population growth.[4] This barrier was the outcome of steady population growth over the course of the Middle Ages that resulted in a topmost yield on the population, particularly in densely populated regions where forests were close to nonexistent and nearly all arable land was accounted for and cultivated. The cap on the population given these variables was roughly 43 million people in the aforementioned areas by the early fourteenth century. In the more immediate regions of England, France, and northern Italy, land population reached a ratio as high as 40-50 people per square kilometer. [5] This upward-driven population

outstripped the resources available under technology of the time and lead to cyclical shortages at the slightest environmental upset and chronic malnutrition across Western Europe. These smaller epidemics caused a gradual decline in the earlier part of the fourteenth century that allowed the Black Death to decimate the population in a matter of months following the summer of 1347. As a result, the population would not recover to similar numbers until the sixteenth century.[6]

The psychological impact of the plague on Western Europe's population presents a growing pattern of hysteria, violence, and lack of faith in the existing system; through that loss of faith the first major blows were dealt to the power exercised by nobility over the peasantry. Early waves of the pandemic caused what historians on the subject have only been capable of describing as mass hysteria. Doctors and the clergy alike lacked an explanation for the cause of this disease that ravaged seemingly beyond control, called by a chronicler in Viterbo, Italy, "a divine plague from which no doctor could possibly liberate the sicken." [7] Clergy across Western Europe preached tales of plague origins—" . . . floods of snakes and toads, snow that melted mountains, black smoke, venomous fumes, deafening thunder, lightning bolts, hailstones, and eight-legged worms that killed with their stench—" and inspired frenzied movements of self-flagellation and the burning and butchering of Jews across swaths of Spain, southwest France, and parts of the Low Countries.[8]

As can be seen in the pattern of chroniclers and doctors' reports over the first hundred years of various pandemic and epidemic outbreaks, a sharp decline is revealed in the initial beliefs of otherworldly, divine retribution as the source of disease. A later chronicler in Namur, when reporting on the

causes of a recent outbreak of disease, commented on rising prices, grain shortages, and famine as the root cause, with no mention of divine punishment.[9] In the early fifteenth century, literature on the nature of the plague and succeeding outbreaks focus almost entirely on possible practical and herbal remedies and dismiss remaining bouts of religious hysteria. By mid-century, those years between 1347 and 1360 which had marked a time of increased Jewish persecution and massacre would be replaced by cooperative efforts by Jews and Christians alike in attempts to stall the spreading of disease.[10]

Reflected in this is an introduction of societal skepticism in the authority of the church's knowledge. The clergy and nobility suffered an equally high mortality rate from the Black Death and, particularly in large estates and monastic orders, often at higher rates.[11] This called into question the validity of the hierarchical nature of medieval society: were the clergy and, in particular, the landed nobility, truly imparted their higher status by divine right?

The outbreaks of violence in the wake of the Black Death further alienated the peasantry from their lords and shook the establish power structure by challenging the nobility's monopoly on agriculture and military power. The reinvigoration of the Hundred Years War in the early fifteenth century further ravaged populations of peasants suffering severe shortages on noble lands that had been underworked and overtaken by nature during the steep population decline. [12]

With the population far from a place of recovery, lords defending estates and towns from enemy knights found themselves more and more often forced to find aid in the peasants on their lands. Serfs armed with longbows and rudimentary instruction proved effected against mounted knights and war

horses despite the discrepancy of training and experience. Exacerbated by the increased introduction of canon, by the end of the Hundred Years War the very lords who enlisted aid from their peasants would see an erosion of political power as a result of the loss of the military monopoly knights had previously held.[13] Furthermore, near-mythical figures like Joan of Arc, a peasant woman claiming divine duty to save France, engendered thousands of common people with such belief in her claims as to encourage the French to deploy her against the English, noble-led army. Death by burning at the hands of the English only elevated Joan to the status of martyr for the newly perceived self-empowerment of the peasantry.[14]

Warfare ultimately resulted in a physical and mental migration of large numbers of rural peasants. Physically, those remaining serfs that did not die of disease were left on estates with unmaintainable lands and declining agricultural yields, further complicated by the violence of war. Conflicts were not limited to the battlefield: both enemy and protector ravaged the civilian population. In several regions of France during the reinvigoration of the Hundred Years War knights would often be found attacking the rural population of their own lands for lack of pay and food.[15]

Neither livestock nor people were free from capture by those traditionally painted as the protector of the common people. For many French commoners, the knights and castles of the nobility became as hated as the English invaders. In response, the people sometimes turned to banditry, on occasion rose up in rebellion and even were known to destroy local defense installations. A class war raged throughout the better-studied national war.[16]

The hatred and rebellion of the common people against the nobles presents a shift of mentality in the peasantry from

dependency to defiance of the previous idea of divine ordinance and the right of feudal lords to rule. Combined with the spike in migration of those same peasants to cities following the first outbreaks of plague and war, these factors would deal a fundamental blow to the psychological institution of feudalism.

With the fracturing of the broader, psychological idea of stratification under feudalism came a blow to the key societal components of the institute: the social contract between nobles and their peasants that ensured the security of noble superiority. The modern distinction between the rights of public authority and private authority were not so in the feudal system. Nobles held property not by private right, but by privilege awarded to them as vassals to their own lords, to the highest most authority of the monarch. The same rule of declining power held true for common people beneath the nobility. This gave nobles rights of jurisdiction, heredity, and coercive power that shaped all aspects of life for those peasants living on an estate. Where in modern societal structures these powers are divided between the private and public sector, there was no such distinction under the hierarchical feudalism system.[17]

The estate as an entity holds both a societal classification as well as a physical one as something belonging to an individual. As described by Max Weber, estates establish a class-based community entirely removed from the economical definition of class. Estate-condition, unlike economical class-condition, holds “the expectation of a specific sort of way of life.”[18] Estate, in the medieval sense, implies an unchanging status, a condition of validity in the established hierarchy in both the legal and social sense. In this way, the nature of the estate and a serf’s tie to their lord proved binding in all factors of life and served as the homogenous identity for given regions.[19]

In the wake of the Black Death, the binding nature of the estate's social contract was broken through the inability and disregard of nobles to maintain responsibilities to their peasants. Broadly, noblemen fought wars and protected those on their lands at great personal expense. In exchange, peasants, craftsman, and merchants were expected to provide livelihood for their lord in the form of agricultural yield, service, and taxation.[20] The steep population decline caused by the disease preceded a collapse to the rural economy of Western Europe which these feudal obligations relied.[21]

Prior to the outbreak of disease, the use of marginal land for agricultural production had already damaged the immunity of the population through cyclical famines as previously stated. These factors left the rural population in most of Western Europe halved by the mid fifteenth century. With needed labor scarce for noble estates, the resulting rise in prices for agricultural goods created a vicious cycle of lack of labor causing nobles to hoard needed goods and continued famine and epidemics as a result of scarcity. For many nobles, the means to keep their peasants in servitude were proving less beneficial than the prospect of legally freeing their serfs to become renters, tenant farmers, or to leave altogether in what would become an increased migration of free peasants to the cities. Combined with peasant demands to be legally freed as a result of the fractured belief in the validity of the feudal social contract, the percentage of serfs bound to estates sharply decline in the first one hundred fifty years after 1347. [22]

Prior to the Black Death some 75 percent of all serfs were farm workers bound to noble estates.[23] In releasing the people from their servitude and allowing the migration to cities, the nobility lost a significant influence over the peasantry in the decline of

both donations and the symbolic abuses of power nobles could exercise over their serfs. In owning the land the peasants worked, a lord often demanded three days unpaid labor per week, up to 25 percent in other taxes, and periodical donations for warfare or forced participation.[24]

The life of the peasantry, while no less harsh in the cities than the countryside in terms of mortality rate, was more at the mercy of nobles on estates. Harsh punishments for infractions on proper land usage including poaching and unsanctioned timber-clearing for firewood under noble authority often overshadows rampant sexual-exploitation; the estimates of Laura Betzig that 99,000 out of every 100,000 people living today possess the genes of ancient aristocracy need not be recognized to acknowledge noblemen's tendency to abuse the common people. Bound peasants were subject to the practice of *jus primae noctis*, which gave the lord of the estate the right to have intercourse with a peasant bride on her wedding night. While the practice could be waived with a cash payment, it served as a symbolic custom highlighting a noble's power over his serfs: a power diminished with the freeing of peasants from their obligations to a noble and their ability to migrate. [25]

This model of the urbanization rate can serve as reflective of the rate of peasant migration to the cities in Western Europe as a result of population decimation and nobles legally freeing serfs from the estate.[26]

As for those peasants who with newfound freedom migrated from rural society to urban centers, this physical displacement only further served to sever the bindings of the social contract between nobles and serfs. Cities offered a self-determination previously unattainable to rural peasants. While urban elites rose to fill the power vacuum created by the increasingly dis-

enfranchised landed aristocracy, the nature of the city opened opportunities for wage labor and training in skilled labor nigh-unattainable on the estate.[27] The proliferation of free craftsman and the influence of guilds in cities—as well as the confined spaces containing vastly higher populations—further encouraged the sharing of the ideas of independence and self-reliance. It is well noted artisans made up a bulk of popular rebellions alongside city peasants.[28] Craftsman such as shoemakers, whose work is less physically demanding than that of unskilled agricultural laborer, could combine work with thinking and conversation simultaneously. Adding that craftsman often acted as their own master and had constant contact with customers, there was the opportunity to exchange ideas and information with likeminded civilians.[29]

The social rebellions as a result of increased city populations after the Black Death can be seen as overwhelmingly not revolts on the account of famines or other externalities of rural life, but against the very institution of feudalism. The English Peasant Revolt of 1381 serves as a prime example, encouraged by a wage law passed in 1351 that marks the desperation of the nobility's weakening hold on political and social power. The purpose of the wage law was to stem the trend of rising wages in post-plague years in an attempt to prop up the old, established order.[30] This Statute of Laborers attempted to enforce a policy of commoners working for the same prices as before the Black Death and permitted landowners to insist on payment in service as was the establish feudal contract rather than wages.[31] Stagnating income and the introduction of head taxes to help finance war with France—taxes of which the nobility were exempt—crippled peasants and craftsmen and lead to minor outbreaks of violence between the passage

of the law and the 1381 Revolt.[32] If not in the range of six figures, the rebel forces were in the tens of thousands and led by Wat Tyler. Their demands to Richard II reflect the changing nature of the social tide: “abolishment of the poll tax; pardons for all involved in the rebellion; written charters outlining the rights of peasants; reduction of land rents; and execution of all traitors...people who the commoners especially felt oppressed by.”[33] The arguable success of this rebellion is rooted not in the attainment of its goals, but in the effect on the nobility. Reprisals were swift and underhanded; Wat Tyler was assassinated when attending an arranged meeting to negotiate the abolishment of the head tax and all those in possession of charters—seen as proof of involvement in the rebellion—were rounded up and executed.[34] This reflects a position of fear from the nobility. An act of organized peasants with clear demands and early success in storming and taking small estates served as a clear threat to the established order and required violent reprisals.[35]

This rebellion, functioning as a representation of revolts of the time as a whole, can be seen as not a pleading for past privileges, but for new political rights. Demanding and securing those rights reveal a new-forming societal structure nonexistent under the feudal system and a direct challenge to noble authority to control law and quality of life of the common people.

The increasingly independent role of guilds and craftsman served to shift social and political influence away from the landed nobility to the new-forming urban elite. Merchants in particular grew in wealth and influence in the cities removed from external sources of legitimacy that the landed nobility were dependent.[36] While the essence of the medieval city

still bespoke the idea of common purpose and shared power within the commune, more commonly a trend of wealth shifting from agricultural to mercantile bases presented itself in the mid-fifteenth century. The steep population decline caused a constant fluctuation in agricultural prices. Peasants could purchase goods at low prices but then they nor their nobles could sell surplus at a sustainable return.[37] This disruption of agricultural wealth challenged a factor vital to feudalism: landowning was the only means of attaining status and power. The rising class of urban elites presented a new alternative to attain power through exercising dominance in local markets and city offices.[38]

Removed from the influence of city migration, urban elites, and the loss of the social and political power of nobility were the very physical effects of the Black Death on the structure of estates and the upper class. The death toll on the nobility created a demographic issue that threatened a core right of nobles: inheritance and the structural integrity of primogeniture. For many families, disease wiped out either the majority or all males in the immediate line of succession and often left only distant relatives or solely female heiresses as a seated noble's common-law heir.[39] While there were devices employed to prevent the wider dispersal of family lands or the possibility of female heiresses, the mortality rate among the nobility still had major effects on the power of old, established families that outstripped the effectiveness of those balancing devices.

The Black Death is an example of a demographic crisis. In late medieval England the most frequent reason for the breaking up of old, larger estates was a "failure of heirs" either through sale or the marriage of heiresses.[40] Though in possession of wealth removed from external legitimacy, the new urban

elite coveted titles nonetheless for their social significance.[41] The easiest means to attain rapid upward mobility in the eyes of the social sphere, regardless of physical wealth, remained the acquisition of land and title.[42] This was accomplished through a combination of buying parceled estates broken up because of the collapse of a male line or through marriage as each individually would not provide both land and title required to rise to the status of a new elite.[43]

A new family could not realistically expect to make itself by marriage alone, but by purchasing property in one generation it could rise high enough to add to its purchases by marriage in the next. Thus the late medieval land market was significant because it enabled new families to cross the boundary between those who might expect to extend their estates by marriage and those who could not.[44]

This opening of the land market to a rising class outside the established nobles was made possible by the destruction of primogeniture as a result of the Black Death's death toll on the nobility. In desiring the status of land and title that represented the old ruling class, the new contenders in this previously-closed market served to lessen the unquestioned validity and right of nobles to own and rule land on the basis of blood lineages that had dominated the hierarchy of feudalism prior to the pandemic outbreak.

An overall notion of fear can be seen as accounting for much of the legislation attempts and harsh reprisals against revolts enacted by the nobility in this period of early migration and resettlement. The actions taken, such as the Statute of Laborers passed in 1351 and the violent reprisals following the English Peasant Revolt of 1381, all serve as attempts to reestablish the status quo of fixed peasant wages and unquestioned divisions

of power in the feudal hierarchy. However, the decimation of the population for the nobility as much as the peasantry made nobles unable to prevent the shifting of power and influence from the established aristocracy to the new urban elites. As a result of a large scale failure of primogeniture because of decimated male lines, the acquisition of parceled estates via purchase and marriage only furthered the urban elites' claims to power and attacked the right of nobles to rule on the distinction of their bloodlines.

Coinciding with the societal factors which led to the decline of the aristocracy's ability to exercise political and social power in Western Europe are the economic shifts that aided in the destruction of the influence of agriculturally-based "old wealth—" that is, the wealth of established lines of nobility. The major economic changes that damaged the feudal system center on property rights of the nobility, the various economic crises that highlighted the century and a half following the Black Death, the nature of the cash economy in medieval Europe, and the increased influence of guilds and craftsman.

The mortality rates on account of the Black Death redefined the cost and benefit scale in defining and enforcing property rights. The institution of serfdom, of obligations from king to lordly vassals down the line to peasants, is central to the structure of feudalism. Within this institute is a dependency on several factors: an agricultural economy based on utilizing land capital resources, a workforce with the productivity to outweigh the marginal cost of the lord's obligations to his serfs, and a low marginal value of labor and human capital dependent on a large workforce.[45] The existence of an agricultural economy is key to the medieval property rights in relation to land capital equating to wealth. Though equal to roughly two percent of

the population, nobles and landowning clergy accounted for the ownership of the majority of land.[46] In order for the wealth of the land to exceed the cost of ownership and defined property rights, the yield of arable and marginal land must be enough to guarantee the health of the workforce, the security of the noble and his family, as well as a surplus for sale and profit.[47] This profitability relates to both the importance of an agricultural economy to medieval nobles and the fulfillment of the contractual obligations between peasants and nobles outlined in the institute of feudalism. A high population of serfs in service to a noble estate ensures a low marginal value of labor and human capital and high returns on agricultural yields.

The abrupt decline in the population and therefore the workforce after the Black Death rapidly changed the benefits and costs of property rights and the marginal value of labor. The cost of maintaining an estate and fulfilling all factors that allow the medieval agricultural economy to enfranchise the nobility were upheaved by the decimation of the workforce. Because of the declined number of serfs, the cost of human resources and the value of labor rose dramatically relative to other factors of production.[48] With this increased value of human capital, human factors began to be treated more as communal property than private property. Labor shifted to a resource to be parceled out carefully at a higher transactional cost which greatly weakened the institute of serfdom that had been dependent on low transaction fees between nobles demanding labor and serfs providing it.[49]

Furthermore, nonhuman resources were made less valuable, particularly land and structures such as estates, because of the increased marginal value of labor. This creates a pattern of decreased enforcement of property rights. Nobles abandon

claims to the value of property ownership by legally freeing serfs. Serfs, in turn, relinquished their subordinate claims from the previous structure of feudal obligations, “even when that required leaving their home villages altogether in order to escape the beleaguered lord’s wrath.”[50] This decline in the incentive for feudal lords to maintain property rights allowed for the breaking up of estates to avoid bankruptcy from lack of agricultural profit. This provided the opportunity for the new urban elite to purchase fractured, impoverished estates because their wealth was not dependent on the agricultural economy to be successful.[51]

Making a closer examination of the collapse of the agricultural economy can point to the sources of the major economic crises of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries that further disenfranchised the nobility and left many established families bankrupt and forced to parcel estates in land sales. A major source of economic collapse for much of the nobility is rooted in their distrust and inability to comprehend the wealth of cities and the new urban elite. From the perspective of nobles, “the bourgeois appear unnaturally wealthy and unnaturally rebellious. If rural society is taken as the standard. . . agriculture is the only natural source of wealth [and] the wealth of the city may be deemed unnatural.”[52] Under a feudal system where status is organized from the top down and kings, clergy, and nobles are ordained by God, the urban elites were an upstart class removed from established feudalism and a threat to predetermined authority.

The success of urban elites and the failure of the landed nobility in turn are seen in their respective sources of wealth: industry versus agriculture. City industry included the production of clothing, ships, metalworks, and hundreds of other

specialized goods, each an individual market with separate demands.[53] With the noble dependency on agricultural wealth, the population decline from disease was immediately disastrous to their income as well as in their long run economic growth. To avoid bankruptcy from seemingly unprofitable landholdings, nobles sold to the urban elites that took knowledge of industry unknown to the nobility and applied it to estate lands. Urban elites turned new profits through the sale of timber, the raising of cattle and sheep on old farmlands turned to pastures, and the lending of money to newly-freed peasants and tenant farmers. With few exceptions, older noble families were slow to adapt to new avenues of economic profit and those who did were more likely to belong to the new aristocracy populated by the urban elites rather than feudal bloodlines.[54]

The cash economy of medieval Europe also served to disenfranchise noble wealth in relation to the population decline and increased the economic empowerment of peasants and craftsmen. Because of the nature of a cash economy, a declined population in turn provides for the per capita distribution of wealth to increase. With the decreased workforce, those remaining peasants and craftsman that did not die during the pandemic were able to demand higher wages and greater independence of labor and leisure time because of the higher quantity of workers demanded versus the quantity supplied.[55]

Though wages continued to fluctuate over the next several centuries, they maintained a trend of steady increases from 1347 forward because of the continually higher death-rate than birth-rate, particularly prevalent in cities where repeated outbreaks of epidemics were more common. These outbreaks only increased the already high mortality rate: one in ten women remained prone to die in childbirth and 25 to 30 percent of babies

were stillborn.[56] With labor functioning as a newly scarce resource as a result of continued outbreaks of disease, workers possessed a higher bargaining power than the nobility, unlike the previous noble-peasant relationship. In this way, peasants and craftsmen could make nobles compete for labor and in doing so raise wages as can be seen in the graph detailing wage trends in the decades prior the Black Death and those succeeding it.[57]
[58]

Wage increases can also be seen to directly correlate with the degree of infection in various Western European kingdoms. Areas such as the Low Countries that suffered less epidemics of plague and, in some instances, avoided infection all together gave the nobility a comparative advantage in maintaining economic power to areas of greater infection like England and France. Lower degrees of population loss meant lower wages because the marginal value of human labor was not increased as drastically as those areas more widely affected by population decline.[59]

The increase in wages overall in those areas most affected increased the value of skilled labor from craftsmen and artisans and decreased the influence the nobility previously held with their monopoly on the agricultural market. Where the influx of population to the cities and the increase of learning opportunities for unskilled workers from guilds would seem to point to a greater quantity supplied of craftsmen and artisans, in the case of medieval cities it inspired a tighter organization of guilds and the guarding of guild secrets.[60] This artificially restricted the number of skilled laborers to maintain a greater scarcity of labor resource and maintain wages at early post-plague levels.[61]

The established nobility proved lacking where the urban elites were capable of not only adapting to the monetary gains

provided by industry but also using the traditional ideas to further supplement status and income. The shifting of wealth from the old nobility to new urban elite is the result of two conflicting ideals: the desire to maintain traditional concepts of power, wealth, and economic success versus the willingness to evolve in the rapidly shifting demographics and sources of income provided by the increased population of medieval cities. Because of their inability or unwillingness to adapt to the shifting base of wealth in the post-plague economy, nobles lost the resources of the expansive, physical estates and elevated wealth key to their economic domination prior to the Black Death.

The destruction of nearly 60 percent of the European population from the pandemic Black Death and subsequent epidemics points to factors geographical to the plague, the psychological effects, social upheavals, and economic rearrangements that caused the decline in the power of nobility under the institution of feudalism. These causes in correlation with the population decline destroyed the structural integrity of feudalism that had maintained validity and strength since the early Middle Ages and would only see further decline and extinction into the Renaissance and modern era.

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Policy Implementation To Reduce Household Waste

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Abstract

The production of waste is a global issue that affects many countries. As countries put into place social stigmas, economic incentives, and public policies to reduce the waste that they are producing, the United States, who is one of the biggest producers of waste, should take necessary actions as other countries effectively and efficiently reduce the amount of waste they produce. Throughout this paper, a comparison of cases from Korea, India, and Sweden, who all use different methods to achieve their results, helps guide United States environmentalists and policy makers on how they can reduce the amount of

waste being produced.

1. Introduction

Household-Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) is the trash that consists of everyday products thrown away in the household (EPA, 2013). Some examples of household waste include food, paper, glass, furniture, paper, clothing, and grass clippings. For the past several years, the importance of household waste has risen as countries around the world started implementing policies to reduce it. However, there are 2.6 trillions pounds of trash produced every year (Gringer, 2018). Even with the United States being one of the biggest waste producers, it is becoming an international problem. If this problem is not dealt with domestically by implementing policies to reduce household waste, it will need to be dealt with on an international level in the future.

1.1 Importance of Reducing Household Waste

Over half of the household waste is dealt with in non-environmentally safe ways. Due to that, it imposes risks not only on the environment, but also on human health. Household waste can be generally divided into two types: hazardous (batteries, household cleaners, etc.) and non-hazardous (food scraps, paper, bottles, etc.). Hazardous, toxic waste causes harm to plants, animals, and people when it ends up in the air, streams, and grounds. The toxic substances get absorbed by wildlife before they can be accumulated, which transfers to humans as they consume these fish and animals. The household waste emits the same amount of greenhouse gas as 7 coal-fired power plants (EPA, 2016). The greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, when released into the atmosphere, cause the increasing temperatures of the planet by trapping the heat. While exposure to hazardous components of waste can lead to

chemical poisoning or cancer, exposure to organic domestic waste can result in different types of chronic and infectious diseases. To reduce the environmental and health harm that waste causes, preventative methods of proper waste disposal have to be undertaken.

This paper analyzes and compares the policies on waste production in three countries (Sweden, Korea, and India) to create a model for the United States. The purpose of the paper is to help guide environmentalists in the United States reduce the amount of waste produced.

2. Background

2.1 History of Waste in United States

Prior to 1976, governmental waste management was seen mostly as “a local function performed by individual citizens, private contractors, and county and municipal governments” (Aulston, 2010). The first legislation to address waste management at all in the United States was the Public Health Services Act of 1944 (PHSA). This loosely applied to waste and did not allocate responsibility for enforcement to any level of government, subsequently leading to little impact in the following twenty years. Following the PHSA was The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA). This piece of legislation encouraged states to take a loftier role in waste management, even though this focused more on air and water pollution. 1970 brought about the Resource Recovery Act, the first act to directly address MSW. The most obvious policy change included in The Resource Recovery Act was the delegation of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management to the EPA. In 1976, the United States finally had its first comprehensive federal plan that universally regulated landfills, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). This directly allocated enforcement to the

states as well as the federal government. This has acted as the foundation for waste management legislation in the United States since, remaining current through amendments like the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA).

2.2 Current Waste Information for United States

The most up-to-date waste information in the United States was done by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2015. The information the EPA collected showed that in the United States, about 262 million tons of municipal solid waste were generated; of that waste, 68 million tons of MSW were recycled, 23 million tons of MSW were composted, more than 91 million tons of MSW were recycled and composted, more than 33 million tons of MSW were combusted with energy recovery, and more than 137 million tons of MSW were landfilled (EPA, 2019). The data collected by the EPA also shows that the United States has had an increasing generation rate of municipal solid waste since the 1960s, starting at around 88.1 million tons of municipal solid waste generated in 1960 to 262.3 million tons of municipal solid waste generated in 2015 (EPA, 2019).

3. Case Studies

3.1 Case in Sweden

In 1994 the city of Varburg, a region in Southwest Sweden, instituted a weight-based billing system to address the issue of MSW. This system charged residents 1.31 SEK (~\$0.14 USD) per every kg of waste brought to the curbside for collection, along with a minimum 300 SEK (~\$31.53 USD) to cover management expenses (Sterner, 1998). This plan was initiated strategically during a “Green Shopping” campaign that was instituted throughout Sweden. Green shopping campaigns involve the promotion and subsidization of businesses committed to protecting the environment (Van, 2011).

A study conducted by Thomas Sterner and Heleen Bartelings, professors at the University of Göteborg Department of Economics, Gothenburg, Sweden, discussed the implications of a weight-based billing system on the sustainable behaviors of the population of Varburg, Sweden. The motivation for this study was based around the concern for spatial scarcity for landfills in many countries, as well as the ecological damage that accompanies growing landfills. Without a proper incentive, landfills grow exponentially with population growth and are quite unsustainable. However, if the charge for waste management is too aggressive, constituents are likely to discard waste in illicit manners, causing further environmental harm. The study focuses on the determinants of total household waste and the effects of unit price payments combined with better access to recycling possibilities.

The methods used in this study included both empirical data and self-reported behavioral data. The researchers collected data from the municipality about household waste disposal collection. This data reflected Varburg, as well Tvååker - a residential area just out of Varburg. The behavioral and attitude based data was collected using a mail questionnaire that was sent to 600 single family households in Tvååker.




Figure1. Waste disposal Tvååker (Sterner, 1998)




Figure 2. Waste disposal in Varberg (Sterner, 1998)

Figure 1 graphs the results of the empirical data collected from the city of Tvååker during the year the weight-based billing system was introduced (smoothed using a three-month moving average). This shows a significant decrease in waste disposed, especially if one refers to the average in 1992 which was 25% higher when accounting for seasonal variation. Figure 2 contains the empirical data for Varburg as a whole, which is more complete and spans a longer period. The effect of weight based billing is clearly visible after January of 1995. When seasonal effects are removed, we find an effective decrease of 29% or 300 tons/month.

The behavioral results offered a great deal of insight into

the reactions of the residents of Varburg to the policy. The results claimed that residents, on average, were composting ~75% of their garden waste and ~60% of kitchen waste. The 11% that admitted to not composting included notes indicating that this is because they lacked the space and did not have the necessary equipment. Another startling conclusion found that 90% of paper, glass, batteries and even hazardous waste was being recycled. Respondents were also asked about their willingness to pay for proper waste management, to which surveyors received an overwhelming response, summed up in a statement from one respondent as “unreasonable the suggestion that they should pay someone else to sort their waste.” This question received a response from only 57% of all respondents, with 60% of the actual responses being 0 SEK. We can conclude from this that once recycling measures become accessible and more affordable that waste management services, people are likely to greatly prefer self management and composting.

Limitations of this study are prominent, yet unlikely to invalidate its credibility. One concern is the age of this study, as most data was collected in the late 1990s. Much of the data was also self-reported, which can lead to many response biases. Respondents who recycle infrequently feel guilt for their actions, leading them to misreport. Also, many respondents may not have a truly accurate number for their composting report as they likely do not weigh it before it is processed.

3.2 Case in Korea

In the 1990s, Korea realized the urgency of reducing the municipal waste production that had been growing due to the country’s rapid industrial and economic growth, and the limited carrying capacity (Lee, 2011). While the Korean government

knew that something had to be done, they struggled to acquire the land and build the facilities that were needed to reduce municipal solid waste production due to increasing land values and the public not wanting waste facilities near their properties (Lee, 2011).

In 1995, Korea implemented a volume-based waste fee system which required every household to buy specific plastic bags for waste disposal while the disposal of separated recyclables, paper, plastic, metal, and glass, is free of charge. While each community has a slightly differing fee system, the average price for a certified waste bag ranges from around \$1.2 to \$2 U.S dollars for a 22.7 gallon bag (Lee, 2011). With the implementation of the volume-based waste fee system Korea has had a drastic shift in the allocation of waste, as their overall production of waste has not changed much, but they saw a 44.44% increase in recycling from 1994 till 2008 and a 60.86% decrease in the landfill method during the same time period (Lee, 2011). During the time frame of 1991 till 2008 Korea also saw a decrease in the total municipal solid waste per person per day which dropped from 2.3 kg to 1.04 kg (Lee, 2011). While there is an assumption that the main cause of the increase in recycling and decrease in municipal solid waste per person per day was the unit pricing system, there were some other policies that Korea implemented that may have affected this data including: Mandatory waste management planning for congregate housing site developments, new waste treatment facility constructions, and the government offering financial aids to support energy cost for the biofuel produced by incineration and landfill treatment (Lee, 2011).

Korea's successful implementation of a mandatory volume-based waste fee system created a want to study and understand-

ing recycling and waste management behaviors. A survey that was created to do so analyzed data from the Greater Seoul Area in June and July 2008 and had a total of 196 responses, which were 56.9% female, 90% college graduates or had achieved some level of higher education, and 74.4% lived in apartments (Lee, 2011). The results which are shown in the table below revealed that people who have a high concern for the environment reported a higher level of participation with recycling, people who reported high interest in waste management showed higher participation with food separation and recycling, and people who agreed with food separation and recycling reported higher participation in both food separation and recycling. Another interesting result is that people who are older and have higher income reported a higher participation level with food separation and recycling. Overall the factors that affect recycling and waste management behaviors the most are waste management attitudes, age, and income (Lee, 2011).

Variables	Food Separation Behavior	Recycling Behavior
NEP	.120	.154
Waste management attitude	.396	.464
Waste reduction attitude	.218	.298
Recycling attitude	.181	.217
Food separation attitude	.258	.332
Age	.222	.192
Gender	.104	.121
Education	.069	.032
Family number	.129	.125
Income	.248	.202
Area	.158	.092
Waste management responsibility	-.047	0.777
*p<.05; **p<.01.		

Table 1. Correlations between variables. (Lee, 2011)

This survey helps show that while a legal regulation can help control waste management behaviors, a more lasting effective strategy would be increasing the education around the environments, exposing the public to social concerns and economic issues regarding waste control and creating policies that enhance sustainability and environmental attitudes (Lee, 2011).

While this survey and the information and results that it gave us are very helpful when thinking about policy options for the United States, some limits to this paper are that the data is outdated, there was a low number of respondents, the respondents were skewed toward people in apartments and college educated individuals, and when looking at social issues, response bias may also be an issue.

3.3 Case in India

Due to populational and industrial growth, India has been facing a challenge with managing municipal solid waste. In 2016, Indian government restructured its regulations that were previously set in 2000 and has been extended beyond municipal areas (Samadder, 2016). India alone generates on average 62 million tonnes annually (PIB, 2016). Kumar and Samadder conducted a case study in 2016, "An empirical model for prediction of household solid waste generation rate- A case study of Dhanbad, India." While taking into account all the changes happening in the country, they have developed two empirical models to predict waste generation rate and have taken into consideration all the independent variables.

The study was conducted in the main urban region with a population of 253,461, which is around 40,000 households. The generation rate in the area was 0.41kg/c/d (Khan, 2016). The area did not have any demarcated landfill sites, meaning that the solid waste has been directly disposed in low lying areas of the city (Pande, 2015). Because of unlimited resources that developing countries have, there was not enough past data to rely on to make a prediction of future generation rate. That is not only due to resources, but also due to constant changes happening in the country, such as economic activity and tourism. Present regression model data identified the factors that possibly resisted changes in economic condition of population. This is to say that the model helps with identifying independent variables in addition to helping researchers make predictions.

The study consisted of two major steps: data collection and model development. Data collections consists of smaller steps: selection of representative household, surveys and interviews, sample collection, and sample analysis. The households were

selections from previous published records and over a hundred households were surveyed and interviewed to collect primary data on their household income, education level, household size, occupation, and other needed information. The surveys have been prepared by using demography of the area and the study of literature. Out of those households, fifty were randomly picked to utilize their data in the study. Following that, the sampling has been done over seven consecutive days in those fifty selected households to assess the consumption in the households. Daily, they supplied each with two polyethene bags, one for biodegradable and one for non-biodegradable waste. The results showed that biodegradable exceeds by 4% non-biodegradable. The most amount was kitchen and yard waste- 49% and the least in metals and glass- 3%. Table 1 provides more detailed information on results.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TO REDUCE HOUSEHOLD WASTE

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TO REDUCE HOUSEHOLD WASTE

11

The results showed that biodegradable exceeds by 4% non-biodegradable. The most amount was kitchen and yard waste- 49% and the least in metals and glass- 3%. Table 1 provides more detailed information on results.

	Components	Materials	Composition (% by weight)
Biodegradable waste	Kitchen and yard waste	Food Waste (e.g., food and vegetable refuse, fruit skins, corn cob), yard waste (e.g., leaves, grass, tree trimmings), etc.	49
	Paper/cardboard	Newspaper, cardboard, tetrapak , corrugated board, box board, newsprint, magazines, tissue, office paper, and mixed paper, etc.	3
Non-biodegradable waste	Plastic	Plastic bags, food containers, bottles, plastic toys, milk pouches, shopping bags, etc.	9
	Metals and glass	Ferrous (e.g., food cans, etc.), non-ferrous (e.g., aluminium cans, foil, ware, and bimetal, etc.), wire, fence, knives, bottle covers, etc., and bottles, glassware, light bulbs, ceramics, etc.	3
	Textile and leather	Discarded clothes, rags, leather, rubber, etc.	5
	Inert	Stones and silt, soil, ash, dust, other inorganic material, etc.	25
	Others	Battery, medical waste, sanitary products, etc.	6

Table 2. Composition of municipal solid waste generated from households of the study area. (Mendenhall and Sincih, 2012)

The aforementioned model also consisted of smaller steps: identification of dependent and independent variables, assumption analysis, analysis of dependent against independent variables, use of regression equation, and model determination and its validation. Out of all the variables, only five were chosen, the ones that had the most effect on solid waste management: household size, family income, education, occupation, and fuel used in the kitchen. Table 2 provides detailed information.

Name of variables	Symbol	Type of Variables	Description	Unit
Household size	Xhs	Independent	Number of family members currently residing in the household including the guests present during the entire sampling period	Persons/household
Total family income	Xinc	Independent	Total monthly income of a family	USD/household
Education	Xedu	Independent	Maximum education of the head of the family	Education level/household
Occupation	Xocc	Independent	An activity undertaken by the head of the family to earn livelihood for his family	Occupation level/household
Fuel used in the kitchen	Xfuel	Independent	The type of fuel (LPG, coal, firewood) used for the cooking purpose in the kitchen	Type of fuel used in kitchen/household
Biodegradable waste	Ybio	Dependent	Amount of biodegradable waste generated from the household	kg/c/d
Non-biodegradable waste	Ynon-bio	Dependent	Amount of non-biodegradable waste generated from the household	kg/c/d

Table 3. Description of variables considered for the model development. (Mendenhall and Sincih, 2012)

They tested variables using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 0.05 level of significance. The detailed results can be seen in Table 6, where it can be seen that the p-values of all the variables are higher than 0.05, which means that selected dependent and independent variables were following the normal distribution. “Validity of regression models depends on the error term/ residual to satisfy certain assumptions” (Mendenhall and Sincih, 2012). Normality of residuals was assessed using histograms by plotting a scatter plot between predicted variables and standardized residuals. They followed by using multiple linear regression model and validation of the model.

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	Kolmogorov-Smirnov			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig. (p-value)	Statistic	df	Sig. (p-value)
Biodegradable Waste	0.162	50	0.200	0.881	50	0.374
Non-biodegradable Waste	0.157	50	0.042	0.846	50	0.201
Household Size	0.177	50	0.195	0.877	50	0.152
Total Family Income	0.252	50	0.189	0.792	50	0.012
Education	0.370	50	0.118	0.772	50	0.897
Occupation	0.234	50	0.200	0.818	50	0.662
Fuel Used in the Kitchen	0.425	50	0.263	0.624	50	0.153

Table 4. Tests of normality (Mendenhall and Sincih, 2012)

To get the results, Kumar and Samadder used the SPSS software. It allowed them to estimate the coefficient for each of the independent variables. The regression equation was used to calculate both, a mean of biodegradable and non-biodegradable waste. The results of those models showed the level significance exceed observed level of significance and null hypothesis gets rejected because at least one of the regression coefficients was non-zero. This signifies that the models are statistically valid. These models indicated that they are useful for prediction.

In this study, two researchers developed two models to predict the generation rate of biodegradable and non-biodegradable waste. The study considered five variables and was able to identify which variable affects the most amount of solid waste, which

is the household size. As a result, biodegradable generation rate was higher than the non-biodegradable waste's rate by 0.1. This study provides better data that has already been used by policy makers to make important decisions in the country.

4. Conclusive Discussions

4.1 Model Discussion

All three studies used empirical methods to look at how the countries are doing in terms of waste management. Korea and Sweden collected the data from surveys. Korea collected t two months, and Sweden collected them over a period of eighteen months. India collected samples in addition to surveys for a week; this process took two months in total. The fact that Sweden has collected the data over a period of eighteen months already shows that they have a better comparison to look at. However, their survey, like Korea's, was voluntary, so the results may not be the true reflection of waste in the country. More accurate data collection allowed India to get a better understanding of the waste generation in the country to make better laws preventing waste. Cleaning up the hazardous waste requires tens of millions and takes decades, which is why implementation of prevention policy is essential (Wolters, 2019). Due to differences in empirical specifications as well as sample data, they had different results and different results on the country.

4.2. Limitations to Existing Studies

Sweden, Korea, and India have been picked for this research to compare different methods and regulations in the country and see their success rate. Sweden is known to have one of the best solid waste

has entered developed countries and was able to reduce their waste. India, on the other hand, was a country with one of

the highest waste generation in the world. The limitations in our research was comparing different methodologies. All three countries used different methods to conduct a study; the collection period of the data have been different, which made it difficult to compare the numbers to see the success rates while considering all the variables. In addition, with India still being a developing country with a rising economy, they are behind, which lets the country raise GDP by not having strict regulations. However, in the long run, India is losing by trying to find ways to deal with waste. Since India does not have an example of a perfect model, it does not have enough data to compare. Overall, having three different countries allowed for a comparison of their models, but the small details made it more difficult to find a direct relationship. Even with Korea and Sweden having a successful method to reduce household waste, we did not have enough research for the United States to see how implementing similar methods would result in a success rate. While some smaller cities in the United States have started implementing the policy of charging households based on the weight of the waste they produced, the lack of sample collection in the United States limited the ability to compare all the countries to select the best possible method to reduce the household waste.

4.3 Policy Suggestion

Our policy suggestions for the United States would be to implement a pricing system that would charge individuals a fee per pound of waste that is collected at the curb. Through its success in Sweden and the information that was gathered in Korea and India, we feel it is best that people are charged for the waste they are producing to incentivize them to find other ways to reduce, reuse, or recycle such waste. A pricing system that charges consumers a fee per pound would help generate revenue

for the government which in turn could be used to implement other environmentally friendly measures.

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